Overview
CTRL-A is contained but offline. The task: decrypt an encrypted RVM6 recovery firmware using the B5 token recovered in the_incident_desk, read its six-stage restoration policy, and pick the one chain of signed recovery jobs that satisfies every gate. Many jobs are correctly signed but unsafe, so a valid signature (SIGNATURE_VALID) is never enough. The console only accepts the one defensible chain, and SEAL then opens an authenticated capsule containing the flag.
flowchart LR
B5[B5 from Ch.5] --> ROM[Decrypt ENC6 firmware]
ROM --> POL[6 policy records]
POL --> DFS[Per-stage gate checks over jobs + approvals + witnesses]
DFS --> CH[Unique 6-job chain]
CH --> SEAL[SEAL opens capsule]
SEAL --> FLAG[Flag]
Recon
Provided files
| File | Role |
|---|---|
recovery_firmware.rvm |
ENC6 + 12-byte nonce + XOR ciphertext (the policy) |
firmware_spec.txt |
Firmware format, key schemes, gate semantics |
recovery_jobs.csv |
31 signed jobs across the six stages |
recovery_approvals.csv |
Authorisation tickets |
clock_calibration.csv |
Per-device clock offsets |
monitor_tx/rx.csv, health_tx/rx.csv |
Independent witness receipts |
restore_console.py |
Simulator (AUTH, ROM, JOBS, CHECK, LOAD, STATUS, SEAL) |
sealed_recovery_capsule.json |
AEAD-style capsule holding the flag |
Firmware decryption
KEY = SHA256("BP06-ROM|" + B5) # raw 32 bytes
keystream = HMAC-SHA256(KEY, NONCE || uint32_be(n)), n = 0,1,...
payload = ciphertext XOR keystream
payload = "RVM6" | 0x01 | 0x06 | 6 x 17-byte records | SHA256(records)[0:8]
A correct B5 is confirmed by the RVM6\x01\x06 magic and the trailing 8-byte hash, so the wrong token fails immediately.
Policy records (decoded with the correct B5)
Each 17-byte record is opcode, device, min_tick, max_tick, epoch, flags, param_digest(8).
| # | Stage | Opcode | Device | Corrected tick window | Epoch | Flags |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | VAULT | 31 | AUDIT-VAULT | 520–560 | 47 | 01 |
| 2 | REKEY | 52 | IAM-GW | 540–580 | 48 | 03 |
| 3 | PATCH | 73 | BEX-CONTROL | 548–600 | 49 | 03 |
| 4 | SHADOW | 94 | SHADOW-NODE | 558–610 | 50 | 03 |
| 5 | ATTEST | B5 | SENTINEL | 570–625 | 51 | 07 |
| 6 | RELEASE | D6 | CTRL-A | 580–650 | 52 | 0B |
Flag bits: 01 exact digest chain, 02 corrected ticks strictly increasing with a gap of 4–16, 04 two independent ATTEST witnesses, 08 two independent HEALTH witnesses.
Gate rules (per job)
- Correct step order, device,
BEX-3.1firmware, caseIR-51A2and epoch. param_a|param_bhashes (SHA-256, first 8 bytes) to the record’s parameter digest.- Job
digest = SHA256(first 11 fields)[0:12]andtagHMAC valid under B5. - Corrected tick =
local_tick − offset(device)inside the record’s window. prev_digestequalsSHA256("BP06|GENESIS|" + B5 + "|IR-51A2")[0:12]for stage 1, then the previous job’sdigest.- One same ticket for all stages:
GRANTED, roleIR_LEAD, scopeCTRL-A-RESTORE, signed, window covering the job tick, andvalid_toat least the RELEASE minimum tick (580), so early-expiring tickets fail. - Stages 5 and 6 need a TX/RX witness pair with the same witness ID, matching job digest, at job tick +1 and +2.
Exploitation
The simulator already exposes the exact gate function, so the cleanest approach is a depth-first search: at each stage, expand only jobs the console’s own eligible() accepts, then commit the single complete chain. Solver: restore_system_solver.py.
python3 restore_system_solver.py --b5 <B5>
The search finds exactly one chain:
| Stage | Job | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 1 VAULT | J-B249335F |
ticket RC-61A7, genesis prev_digest, epoch 47 |
| 2 REKEY | J-C048A48C |
REVOKE_LEGACY/EPOCH_48, chained to VAULT digest |
| 3 PATCH | J-B4489CF3 |
NONCE_BOUND/ANTI_REPLAY_ON, tick inside window and 4–16 after REKEY |
| 4 SHADOW | J-77F041C9 |
ISOLATED_BOOT/INTEGRITY_PASS |
| 5 ATTEST | J-7AB6CD1C |
witnesses W-4EECEED + W-7AEBCD3 (same SENTINEL ID) |
| 6 RELEASE | J-01A91481 |
CTRL-A-PROD/READ_WRITE, witnesses W-645B3ED + W-EFC5CEE |
Committing these in order gives STAGES 6/6, and SEAL decrypts the capsule.
Decoy types seen in the data
Seal derivation
seal_key = SHA256("BP06-SEAL|" + B5 + "|" + job_ids + "|" + witness_ids + "|" + ROM_fingerprint)
capsule = XOR stream under seal_key, authenticated with HMAC(seal_key, nonce || ciphertext)[0:24]
Any deviation in the chain or witness IDs changes the key, so the capsule only opens for the true chain, which is why the search must find the exact chain, not just a plausible one.
Flag
Lessons / Takeaways
Techniques
- HMAC Authentication
- Hash Chains
- Clock Skew Normalisation
- Custom XOR Stream Cipher
- Firmware Policy Decoding

