Writeup · Cyberweek Africa 2026 - National CTF (Finals)

The Incident Desk

forensicshardsolvedFlag: FLAG{REDACTED}

Overview

A fictional controller (CTRL-A) incident review was “compromised by poisoned evidence”. The originals survive only as four printed dossiers (A–D) at a physical Incident Desk where no electronic devices are allowed (pen and notepad only). Eight candidate containment cases exist; exactly one is cryptographically authentic, chronologically valid after clock correction, authorised by an IR_LEAD with a GRANTED CTRL-A-CONTAIN permit, following the safe order REVOKE > SNAPSHOT > ISOLATE > HOLD, independently witnessed (OBSERVED TX then CONFIRMED RX for the same HOLD event), and sealed in a custody receipt that carries a 20-hex VAULT_NONCE.

The 11 evidence values from that case are submitted to a portal, which returns a team-specific TEAM_SEAL_NONCE. That seal plus the common continuity token B5 gives the individual flag.

Prerequisites / Setup

  • Paper and notepad (no electronic devices allowed at the Incident Desk)
  • The provided ZIP: README.txt, incident_brief.txt, desk_protocol.txt, clock_offsets.csv, candidate_index.csv, desk_console.py, desk_finish.py, portal_instructions.txt, NOTES_TEMPLATE.txt
  • Python 3.9+ stdlib (for offline verification after transcribing from paper)

Recon

Step 1 — Read the provided files

Goal: Inventory the package and understand the workflow.

File Role
README.txt, incident_brief.txt Workflow and the six validity requirements
desk_protocol.txt Record formats, HMAC scheme, rules
clock_offsets.csv Per-node local_minus_reference skew
candidate_index.csv The 8 case IDs
desk_console.py --verify one row, --commit notes to a B5 candidate
desk_finish.py Team flag from --team --b5 --seal
portal_instructions.txt, NOTES_TEMPLATE.txt Portal flow, 11-field notes template

Candidate cases: IR-51A2, IR-83C4, IR-27B9, IR-61D0, IR-0F75, IR-B8E1, IR-E326, IR-4A98.

Step 2 — Understand the cryptography

Goal: Learn how records are authenticated.

KEY    = SHA256(ASCII("BP05-" + TYPE + "|" + B4))                  # raw 32 bytes, per record type
TAG    = upper(hex(HMAC-SHA256(KEY, fields[:-1] joined by "|")))[:12]
DIGEST = upper(hex(SHA256(first 6 event fields joined by "|")))[:12]
B5     = upper(hex(SHA256("BP05|B4|CASE|REVOKE|SNAPSHOT|ISOLATE|HOLD|PERMIT|PLAN|TX|RX|CUSTODY|VAULT_NONCE")))[:12]
FLAG   = FLAG{BP05_<B5>_<upper(hex(HMAC-SHA256(bytes.fromhex(SEAL), "BP05|B5|TEAM")))[:12]>}

Every record’s HMAC is keyed from B4, so authenticity can only be checked with the Chapter 4 token. A matching digest or a forged but well-formed row proves nothing without the tag check.

Step 3 — Understand the record layouts

Dossier Type Fields
A EVENT (8) case_id, stage, event_id, node, local_tick, prev_digest, digest, tag
B PERMIT (9) permit_id, case_id, operator, role, scope, valid_from, valid_to, decision, tag

(continued for dossiers C–H)

Flag

FLAG{REDACTED}

Derived as FLAG{BP05_<B5>_<HMAC-SHA256(seal, "BP05|B5|TEAM")[:12]>}.

Lessons / Takeaways

  • Paper dossiers can be forged unless every record is independently verified.
  • Clock skew must be corrected before comparing timestamps across nodes.
  • Chain-of-custody requires independent witnessing (TX + RX for the same HOLD event).
  • HMAC tags keyed from a Chapter-4 token mean authenticity cannot be checked without that token.
  • The portal seal plus continuity token B5 binds the individual flag to the team’s submission.

Mitigations

  • Always verify HMAC tags over all evidence fields, not just a digest.
  • Correct for clock skew before comparing timestamps.
  • Require independent two-sided witnessing (TX and RX) for custody events.
  • Bind seals and continuity tokens to team submissions to prevent substitution.

Techniques

  • HMAC Verification
  • Clock Offset Correction
  • Chain of Custody
  • Offline Forensics

References