Overview
The application provides a ZIP containing computer.json, gplink.json, and scope.txt. The goal is to determine the correct collection receipt and submit it to /submit. The page also exposes GET /, POST /submit, GET /downloads/pavilion-export.zip, and GET /health.
Prerequisites / Setup
export TARGET="<challenge URL or IP>"
Download pavilion-export.zip and inspect computer.json, gplink.json, and scope.txt locally. No credentials are required.
Recon
Step 1 — Enumerate endpoints and download the export
Goal: Map the application surface and obtain the GPO data.
GET /
POST /submit
GET /downloads/pavilion-export.zip
GET /health
Endpoints such as /console, /admin, /debug, /api, /robots.txt, and /sitemap.xml returned 404. The page JavaScript contained a hidden console mode, but /console did not exist, so it was unnecessary.
Download and unzip:
curl -O "$TARGET/downloads/pavilion-export.zip"
unzip pavilion-export.zip
Enumeration
Step 2 — Analyze computer.json
Goal: Identify the computer’s OU, group, and inheritance setting.
{
"ou": "OU=Stage,DC=pavilion,DC=test",
"groups": ["Crew"],
"blockInheritance": true
}
Key facts:
- Computer is in OU
Stage. - Computer belongs to group
Crew. blockInheritanceistrue, so ordinary inherited GPOs are blocked.
Step 3 — Analyze gplink.json
Goal: Find the GPO link that applies despite blocked inheritance.
There are 35 GPO links. The important fields are linkOrder, enabled, securityFilter, enforced, guid, serviceAccount, and command. The critical entry is link 15:
GUID: 582dd884f15ee41330ceb416c60c6a1c
linkOrder: 15
enabled: true
securityFilter: Crew
enforced: true
serviceAccount: svc-620a984fb8
command: job-ee685b72ec4b
This is significant because:
- The computer is a member of
Crew. - The GPO is filtered to
Crew. - It is
enabled. - It is enforced — an enforced GPO passes through blocked inheritance.
- The computer has
blockInheritance: true.
This matches scope.txt: > A recent renovation changed which local group can use the service wing. Facilities kept one central instruction in place throughout the work.
- local group →
Crew - service wing →
Stage - central instruction → enforced GPO
- kept in place →
enforced: true
Vulnerability Analysis
The scenario models Group Policy Object (GPO) enforcement / inheritance bypass in Active Directory (related to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, as policy application can exceed intended restrictions).
Exploitation
Step 4 — Determine the receipt format
Goal: Find the combination of fields accepted by /submit.
Individual values (serviceAccount, command, GUID, linkOrder, Crew, Visitors, Stage, etc.) and simple combinations (svc:job, job:svc, guid:svc, guid:job) all failed. The breakthrough was testing the three identifying GPO fields together with | as separator.
Successful receipt:
582dd884f15ee41330ceb416c60c6a1c|svc-620a984fb8|job-ee685b72ec4b
Step 5 — Submit the receipt
Goal: POST the receipt and retrieve the flag.
POST /submit
Content-Type: application/json
{"answer":"582dd884f15ee41330ceb416c60c6a1c|svc-620a984fb8|job-ee685b72ec4b"}
{
"message": "safctf{REDACTED}",
"ok": true
}
Flag
safctf{REDACTED}
Returned by POST /submit for the effective GPO receipt.
Lessons / Takeaways
- Identify the effective GPO, not every value in the link list —
blockInheritancedoes not stop an enforced GPO. - The combination
blockInheritance=true,securityFilter=<computer's group>,enabled=true,enforced=trueuniquely identifies link 15. - The receipt is
GUID|serviceAccount|commandfor that effective GPO.
Mitigations
- Be cautious with enforced GPOs: they override
blockInheritanceand can apply policy the object owner intended to block. - Audit which GPOs are enforced and which security filters they use; enforce least privilege at the GPO level.
- Review effective (Resultant Set of Policy) settings rather than inheritance settings alone.
Techniques
References
- Microsoft, “Group Policy inheritance and enforcement”: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/group-policy
- CWE-284: Improper Access Control: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html

