- Use
calibration.wav(known plaintextA6 3C) to calibrate the FSK tones, bit ordering, and time slots.
Points: 250 (MEDIUM)
R2 (retained for Chapter 3): 60AAA70740D0
A fictional Coastal Research Relay (CR-MVT) monitor recording contains several FSK-encoded bursts interleaved with a noisy adjacent-channel programme, a corrupted dropout, and an independent replay. The genuine archive frames must be separated from decoys, their payloads reversed with the Chapter 1 relay token R1, and the message reconstructed.
All traffic, stations, and the protocol are synthetic; the historical citations (1953 African Broadcasting Service, 1954 Kenya Broadcasting Services) are genuine context only.
Overview
The task is to:
- Use
calibration.wav(known plaintextA6 3C) to calibrate the FSK tones, bit ordering, and time slots. - Demodulate
coastal_monitor_stereo.wav, using the LEFT channel only (Monitor A); the RIGHT channel is a noisy adjacent-channel programme and must not be averaged in. - Reconstruct valid CR-MVT frames (
origin = 0x53) for sequences 0–4, rejecting the BK-TRN test loop (origin = 0x54), the corrupted dropout, and the replay. - Reverse the documented payload transform with R1 (
8EC5C9EBF7C3, recovered in Chapter 1). - Compute the SHA-256 proof and submit
FLAG{LS02_<R2>}.
Recon — calibrating the audio alphabet
From operator_bulletin.txt and calibration.wav:
- Sample rate: 8 kHz, 16-bit PCM.
- Each burst opens with a 1900 Hz marker tone, then a silence gap.
- Binary data is carried by two octave-related lower tones.
- Calibration contains exactly two octets:
A6 3C.
Demodulating calibration.wav (32-sample / 4 ms windows, Goertzel tone power):
| Tone | Meaning | Measured |
|---|---|---|
| ~670 Hz | bit 0 |
matches calibration |
| ~1340 Hz | bit 1 |
octave of the low tone |
| 1900 Hz | burst marker | — |
Bit slot ≈ 448 samples (56 ms), with the tone occupying the first ~360 samples. Bits are sent LSB first within each octet. Verified against calibration: the 16 data slots decode to A6 3C exactly, confirming the tone map, bit order, and slot timing.
Exploitation — demodulation and frame selection
Seven marker bursts were found (matching broadcast_log.csv):
| Burst | Start (s) | Origin | Seq | Length | Checksum | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B01 | 0.70 | 0x53 |
2 | 8 | ok | genuine |
| B02 | 6.97 | 0x53 |
0 | 8 | ok | genuine |
| B03 | 13.24 | 0x54 |
1 | 8 | ok | decoy — BK-TRN test loop |
| B04 | 19.51 | 0x53 |
4 | 8 | ok | genuine |
| B05 | 25.78 | 0x53 |
1 | 8 | ok | genuine |
| B06 | 32.05 | 0x53 |
3 | 8 | BAD | corrupted dropout |
| B07 | 38.32 | 0x53 |
3 | 8 | ok | genuine — replay of B06 |
Check byte (per bulletin §C): S = 0x6D; for each frame octet B excluding the check byte, S = ROTL8(S,1) XOR B; expected check = S XOR 0xA7. B06 fails this, consistent with the logged “short signal dropout”; B07 is the independent replay and passes.
Frame format: Origin ID | Sequence | Payload length | Payload (8) | Check byte. The genuine archive set is origin 0x53 (CR-MVT) with sequences 0–4 each exactly once:
| Seq | Burst | Ciphertext payload |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | B02 | 77 94 A7 09 03 01 A9 D0 |
| 1 | B05 | 87 A6 1C 03 66 92 3B C3 |
| 2 | B01 | 97 EC 35 74 81 33 C5 B2 |
| 3 | B07 | FA 34 73 87 34 21 81 9C |
| 4 | B04 | CD 49 F8 0A 36 91 97 EE |
BK-TRN (B03, origin 0x54) passes checksum but is excluded on origin — a valid checksum is not a signature, per the bulletin.
Payload recovery — ledger key
R1 from Chapter 1: 8EC5C9EBF7C3 → six octets K = [0x8E, 0xC5, 0xC9, 0xEB, 0xF7, 0xC3].
For payload octet i in sequence s:
M = ROTL8(K[(s+i) mod 6], 1) XOR ((0x39 + 17*s + 29*i) mod 256)
P[i] = C[i] XOR M
Concatenating sequences 0–4 (no separators) yields readable ASCII:
SIGNALS_FROM_THE_COAST_CARRY_OLD_TRUTHS!
A correct R1 is confirmed by the fact that the recovered bytes are fully printable ASCII rather than garbage.
Flag computation
Final proof (bulletin §E):
LS02|8EC5C9EBF7C3|SIGNALS_FROM_THE_COAST_CARRY_OLD_TRUTHS!|CR-MVT
SHA-256 (uppercase): 60AAA70740D0B703845AA316610897C8197B0ED0119339D50D391255512CFEDE
R2 (first 12 hex chars): 60AAA70740D0
FLAG{REDACTED}
Lessons / Takeaways
- Demodulate from the correct channel only: Monitor A is LEFT; averaging with the adjacent-channel RIGHT programme corrupts the tones.
- Calibrate tone/frequency, bit order, and slot timing from a known plaintext sample before trusting any demodulated output.
- A valid checksum never proves authenticity: corroborate origin (
0x53CR-MVT vs0x54BK-TRN), recorder observations, and expected sequence coverage. - Corrupted and replayed bursts look structurally identical to good ones; select frames by origin + sequence set, not checksum alone.
Techniques
- Audio Steganography
- FSK Demodulation
- Checksum Validation
- Protocol Reconstruction

