Event: Cyberweek Africa 2026 - National CTF (Finals) Category: Supply chain audit (Misc) Points: 500 Flag: `FLAG{REDACTED}
Summary
A municipal emergency relay received an update that passed the build server’s green checks, then began accepting unauthorised handovers. Investigators recovered the uploaded package, a QA reference, several independent source snapshots, competing dependency packages, and signed build receipts.
The goal: audit the software supply chain, identify the contaminated build, reproduce the authorised production artefact byte-for-byte, verify the release evidence against provenance/production_policy.json, and open the sealed disclosure to recover the flag.
Everything is local and simulated. Python 3.9+ standard library is sufficient. No network services or external infrastructure are required.
Solver script: solve.py (at the challenge root). It builds every source × dependency pair, screens all seven receipts against the production policy, and opens the sealed disclosure with the authorised artefact.
Evidence
Receipt screening against provenance/production_policy.json
Policy constraints:
status == "APPROVED"channel == "production"scope == "RM-APPROVAL-17"issued_at_utc <= 2026-10-27T14:00:00Z- signatures must cover roles
{release-authority, independent-witness} - signer
legacy-prod-1is revoked (not_accepted_signers)
| Record | Status | Channel | Issued | Cutoff | Signers (roles) | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CWA-RM-BUILD-009 | APPROVED | production | 13:44 | ✅ | prod-release-2 (release-authority) ✅ + independent-audit-4 (independent-witness) ✅ | AUTHORIZED |
| CWA-RM-BUILD-000 | GREEN | qa | 12:07 | ✅ | qa-bot-1 (qa-automation) + independent-audit-4 (independent-witness) | ❌ wrong status & channel |
| CWA-RM-BUILD-001 | APPROVED | qa | 12:10 | ✅ | qa-bot-1 + independent-audit-4 | ❌ wrong channel; no release-authority |
| CWA-RM-BUILD-003 | APPROVED | production | 11:25 | ✅ | legacy-prod-1 REVOKED + independent-audit-4 | ❌ revoked signer |
| CWA-RM-BUILD-005 | PREVIEW | production | 13:02 | ✅ | prod-release-2 + independent-audit-4 | ❌ not APPROVED |
| CWA-RM-BUILD-007 | APPROVED | partner | 12:55 | ✅ | partner-release-3 (partner-qa) + independent-audit-4 | ❌ wrong channel; no release-authority |
| CWA-RM-BUILD-011 | APPROVED | production | 14:05 | ❌ after freeze | prod-release-2 + independent-audit-4 | ❌ issued after cutoff |
Only CWA-RM-BUILD-009 satisfies every policy constraint, with both required signature roles verified via RSA-PKCS#1v1.5-SHA256 against the pinned trust roots.
Byte-for-byte reproduction
The accepted claim CWA-RM-BUILD-009 attests artifact SHA256 4f42d3d0659e83c25b9ee2355c77f0598d0e676e525114b8a29808f0e1f36bd4.
Building all 24 source × dependency pairs with tools/repro_builder.py, that hash reproduces only from:
sources/s_31cd.tar×dependencies/v_70aa.whl
The authorised build is the “hardened production branch”:
controller.py(POLICY = "production"): requiresactiveANDverifiedANDaudit_chain == required_audit_chainANDroute == approved_route. No emergency override.packet.py(“verified supplier origin”):verifiedonly when the signature starts withsig:and is ≥ 20 chars; does not manufacture or replace the audit chain.
The compromised upload
dist/build000_uploaded.pkg hashes to 3b329373cf2431c68c183496597995bb44691e207e970be34bb40598310d7c38, which is claim CWA-RM-BUILD-000 (s_56be.tar × v_3d82.whl). It contains the backdoor:
controller.py(“experimental emergency branch”):if request.get("emergency"): return True— authorises unauthenticated emergency handovers.packet.py(“mirror override”): always returnsverified: Trueand replaces the audit chain withexpected_chainfrom the packet itself.
Red herrings
v_1b7c.whlcontainsSAMPLE_FALLBACK = "FLAG{REDACTED}"— a valid-looking flag-shaped string that is only a QA calibration marker, not proof of an authorised release.dist/qa_reference.pkg(= CWA-RM-BUILD-001) carries that same QA marker; its channel isqa, notproduction.
Opening the sealed disclosure
tools/open_release.py requires:
- The byte-identical artifact (reproducible from the original source + dependency archives),
- The artifact hash matching exactly one eligible, dual-signed production release claim,
- The HMAC authentication tag over the sealed capsule to verify.
Running it against the authorised artefact:
python3 tools/open_release.py \
--source sources/s_31cd.tar \
--dependency dependencies/v_70aa.whl \
--artifact authorized_release.pkg
Output:
Authorized receipt: CWA-RM-BUILD-009
RelayMesh production restore accepted.
Finding: the uploaded green artifact combined an emergency-bypass controller with a mirror-supplied packet parser that overwrote the audit chain.
The only permitted recovery is the independently witnessed, dual-signed production build.
EVIDENCE: no release should be trusted solely because its CI status is GREEN.
FLAG: FLAG{REDACTED}
The HMAC tag check passes (calc_tag == tag), which cryptographically confirms the derived decryption key is correct — no other key produces a valid tag, so the plaintext is authoritative.
Vulnerability Analysis
Flag
`FLAG{REDACTED}
Solver script
solve.py at the challenge root reproduces the solve programmatically:
- Screens every receipt against
production_policy.json(status, channel, scope, cutoff, dual signature roles, revoked signers). - Builds all 24 source × dependency pairs with
repro_builder.build(). - Finds the pair whose SHA256 matches the accepted claim CWA-RM-BUILD-009 (
s_31cd.tar × v_70aa.whl). - Writes
authorized_release.pkgand prints theopen_release.pycommand to open the sealed disclosure.
Run:
python3 solve.py
python3 tools/open_release.py --source sources/s_31cd.tar --dependency dependencies/v_70aa.whl --artifact authorized_release.pkg
Notes
- The relay, packages, receipts, trust roots, and sealed disclosure are fictional competition material.
- A green CI indication, matching version labels, or a FLAG-shaped string inside a package are not proof of an authorised release; only the reproducible digest attested by the required signing roles is authoritative.
- The authenticated capsule is opened only with the original source archive, the original dependency archive, and the byte-identical artefact — knowing a build hash alone is insufficient.

