Writeup · Cyberweek Africa 2026 - National CTF (Finals)

Blackstar 2: The Uplink

cryptomediumsolvedFlag: FLAG{REDACTED}

Overview

This is a chained crypto challenge: Stage 1 (The Downlink, steganography) hides a 12-character relay token inside a PNG frame; Stage 2 (The Uplink) uses that token to derive an AES-256-CBC key, unwraps an outer encryption layer, then breaks a carelessly generated RSA key to recover an intercepted command containing the next relay token.

Prerequisites / Setup

  • Python 3 (PIL/Pillow, sympy, hashlib, Crypto.Cipher.AES)
  • downlink_frame.png (Stage 1 artifact) and uplink.enc (Stage 2 artifact)

Recon

Step 1 — Recover the relay token from Stage 1

Goal: Extract the LSB-embedded relay token from downlink_frame.png.

Stage 1 (blackstar1_the_downlink/downlink_frame.png) is a 720×540 RGB PNG. The least significant bits of the RGB channels, read left-to-right top-to-bottom, contain an ASCII marker:

BLACKSTAR//DOWNLINK//RELAY_TOKEN=007161435C98//KEEP THIS 12-CHAR TOKEN - THE UPLINK LAYER IS LOCKED WITH IT::END::

Stage 1 relay token: 007161435C98.

Step 2 — Inspect uplink.enc

Goal: Confirm the encrypted payload format and recover the JSON payload.

Stage 2 (uplink.enc) format: [16-byte IV][ciphertext], AES-256-CBC with key = SHA-256(relay_token). Decryption yields a JSON payload:

{
  "note": "Intercepted uplink command (textbook RSA, no padding).",
  "n": <1024-bit modulus>,
  "e": 65537,
  "c": <ciphertext>
}

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw classes are Textbook RSA (CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm) and RSA with closely-spaced primes (small-prime-difference / Fermat-factorable modulus).

Exploitation

Step 3 — Derive the AES key and unwrap the layer

Goal: Decrypt uplink.enc to recover the RSA parameters.

Key = SHA-256(“007161435C98”), IV = first 16 bytes of uplink.enc. Decrypt and strip PKCS7 padding to obtain the JSON payload shown above.

Step 4 — Factor the RSA modulus

Goal: Recover p and q from the 1024-bit modulus n.

The two primes are extremely close together. sympy.factorint recovers them instantly:

p = ...2199459236459
q = ...2236110196301

Step 5 — Recover the private exponent and decrypt

Goal: Compute d = e⁻¹ mod φ(n) and decrypt c with textbook RSA.

φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1), d = e⁻¹ mod φ(n). The ciphertext is textbook RSA (no padding), so m = cᵈ mod n yields:

BLACKSTAR//UPLINK//RELAY_TOKEN=9402A282B212//NEXT:FLIGHT-COMPUTER//keep token::END::

The next relay token is 9402A282B212.

Flag

FLAG{REDACTED}

Lessons / Takeaways

  • Chained stages require cross-category context: Stage 1’s steganographic token is the cryptographic key material for Stage 2 — nothing in uplink.enc is solvable without it.
  • Textbook RSA without padding is trivially broken once the modulus is factored: the raw plaintext is recoverable directly from m = cᵈ mod n.
  • Careless prime generation defeats RSA: the two primes were generated too close together, making factorization trivial. Primes must be independently random and of comparable but not correlated size.

Mitigations

  • Use RSA-OAEP (PKCS#1 v2.2) instead of textbook RSA; never encrypt raw plaintext with c = mᵉ mod n.
  • Generate primes independently and randomly with a CSPRNG; reject any pair that is too close together (Fermat-factorable).
  • Use key sizes of at least 2048 bits.

Techniques

  • LSB Steganography
  • AES-CBC
  • RSA
  • Textbook RSA
  • Small Prime Difference

References