Category: Reverse Engineering / Offline Firmware & Handshake Analysis
Flag: FLAG{REDACTED} **B3 (retained for Chapter 4):** 8CD2027966B9 **B2 (from Chapter 2):**35C2C90A3900`
1[.] Objective
Find the single unauthorised, independently confirmed BEX-3 RECOVERY session that activated CTRL-A-ADMIN during the incident window (HELLO tick 250–290), using a VISITOR identity with a counter below the anti-replay floor, an echoed nonce different from the issued challenge, and a response that passes the actual firmware verification[.] Derive B3 using B2 from Chapter 2[.]
2[.] Provided Files
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
incident_brief.txt |
Incident scope, attack narrative, selection criteria |
evidence_protocol[.]txt |
Audit record signing, TX/RX witness verification, VM_PROOF, B3 derivation |
bytecode_spec[.]txt |
BEX-3 VM bytecode specification, input slot mapping, checkpoints |
firmware_probe[.]py |
Decodes and disassembles the obfuscated firmware binary |
evidence_probe[.]py |
Audit explorer — validates audit integrity and TX/RX witnesses |
recovery_firmware[.]bin |
Obfuscated BEX-3 firmware containing NORMAL and RECOVERY VM programs |
handshake_frames[.]csv |
48 shuffled signed audit records (4 phases per session) |
controller_witness_tx[.]csv |
Independent controller TX receipts |
controller_witness_rx[.]csv |
Independent controller RX receipts |
identity_register[.]csv |
Badge → role, anti-replay floor, controller |
witness_roots[.]txt |
TX/RX HMAC verification keys |
session_notes[.]txt |
Additional hints about the two VM programs |
3. Methodology
3.1 Firmware Decoding
The firmware binary is obfuscated using B2 as a stream-cipher key. firmware_probe[.]py --token B2 decodes it:
- Replay floor: 30
- VM seed: 0x46C98E2B
- VM key: 0xD7A28C31
- Firmware CRC32: 0x8407CE50
- Firmware SHA256 prefix: 6CF2648EBFE8
Two VM programs are stored: NORMAL (16 instructions), then RECOVERY (16 instructions).
3.2 VM Architecture
8 registers R0–R7 (initially 0), all arithmetic mod 2^32:
| Opcode | Mnemonic | Operation |
|---|---|---|
| 0x01 | LOAD | R[dst] = input[src] |
| 0x02 | XOR | R[dst] ^= R[src] |
| 0x03 | ADD | R[dst] += R[src] |
| 0x04 | ROL | R[dst] = ROL32(R[dst], imm) |
| 0x05 | MUL | R[dst] *= (imm | 1) |
| 0x06 | XKEY | R[dst] ^= firmware_key |
| 0xFF | HALT | Output R0 as 8 uppercase hex |
Input slots:
| Slot | Source |
|---|---|
| 0 | First 4 bytes SHA256(badge_id | operator_id), big-endian |
| 1 | challenge_nonce (8 hex digits) |
| 2 | echo_nonce (8 hex digits) |
| 3 | HELLO counter (unsigned decimal) |
| 4 | CRC32(session_id) |
| 5 | hello_nonce (8 hex digits) |
| 6 | Firmware seed uint32 |
3.3 The Critical Flaw: NORMAL vs RECOVERY
The two programs are nearly identical, but instruction 4 differs:
| Instruction | NORMAL | RECOVERY |
|---|---|---|
| 04 | LOAD R2, input[1] (challenge_nonce) |
LOAD R2, input[2] (echo_nonce) |
The RECOVERY program XORs the echoed nonce instead of the challenge nonce[.] This means an attacker can supply a different echo_nonce and still get a valid response — the “second independent flaw” mentioned in the spec[.]
Additionally, RECOVERY mode does not enforce counter >= floor, allowing replay with stale counters[.]
3[.]4 Checkpoints
VM_PROOF uses R0 values after instruction indices 7 and 13 (0-indexed across all instructions):
- Checkpoint 7: After
ADD R0, R3(adding counter) - Checkpoint 13: After
XOR R0, R5(XOR with CRC32(session_id))
3[.]5 Session Selection Criteria
| Criterion | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Mode | RECOVERY |
| Badge role | VISITOR |
| Counter | < anti_replay_floor (30) |
| Echo nonce | ≠ challenge nonce |
| HELLO tick | 250–290 inclusive |
| Grant | ACCEPTED, CTRL-A-ADMIN |
| Audit integrity | All 4 records valid tags + intact chain |
| Firmware response | Computed response_tag matches captured value |
| TX witness | ACTUATED at GRANT_tick+1, valid HMAC |
| RX witness | ADMIN_ACTIVE at GRANT_tick+2, valid HMAC |
4[.] Investigation Walkthrough
Step 1 — Decode firmware
Replay floor: 30; VM seed: 46C98E2B; VM key: D7A28C31
Firmware CRC32: 8407CE50, SHA256 prefix: 6CF2648EBFE8
Both NORMAL and RECOVERY programs disassembled[.] The only difference is instruction 4’s input slot (1 vs 2)[.]
Step 2 — Identify candidate sessions
Using evidence_probe.py --list, sessions with VALID audit + BOTH VERIFIED witnesses + tick in [250,290]:
| Session | HELLO Tick | Badge | Role | Counter | Echo vs Challenge | Audit | Witnesses |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HS-2473C0 | 250 | BADGE-EDE1 | VISITOR | 17 | SAME (5750E114) | VALID | BOTH |
| HS-6ABA47 | 258 | BADGE-E7A9 | VISITOR | 12 | DIFFERENT | VALID | BOTH |
| HS-74EC71 | 272 | BADGE-985B | VISITOR | 13 | DIFFERENT | VALID | BOTH |
| HS-A4400D | 265 | BADGE-5FB8 | ENGINEER | 21 | DIFFERENT | VALID | BOTH |
Eliminations:
- HS-2473C0: echo_nonce == challenge_nonce (not different)
- HS-A4400D: badge is ENGINEER, not VISITOR
Remaining: HS-6ABA47 and HS-74EC71[.]
Step 3 — Verify firmware response
Running the RECOVERY VM program for each candidate:
| Session | Computed Response | Captured response_tag | Match? |
|---|---|---|---|
| HS-6ABA47 | FDBB5A34 | FDBB5A34 | ✓ |
| HS-74EC71 | 307951B6 | 307941B6 | ✗ |
HS-74EC71 fails the firmware response check — the gateway said ACCEPTED but the actual firmware would have rejected it[.]
Step 4 — Confirm HS-6ABA47
Session HS-6ABA47 passes every check:
| Phase | Frame ID | Tick | Payload |
|---|---|---|---|
| HELLO | F-EBE7ACB | 258 | badge=BADGE-E7A9, counter=12, mode=RECOVERY, hello_nonce=70046167, operator=OP-1474 |
| CHALLENGE | F-0BEC264 | 259 | challenge_nonce=E4F9C322, device=CTRL-A-REMOTE |
| RESPONSE | F-BEC1B06 | 260 | echo_nonce=1511F7F6, response_tag=FDBB5A34 |
| GRANT | F-3AAD5E6 | 261 | gateway_status=ACCEPTED, requested_role=CTRL-A-ADMIN |
Verification details:
- Badge BADGE-E7A9: actual_role=VISITOR, anti_replay_floor=30, counter=12 < 30 ✓
- echo_nonce (1511F7F6) ≠ challenge_nonce (E4F9C322) ✓
- All 4 audit records: valid tags + intact prev_tag chain ✓
- Firmware response: computed FDBB5A34 = captured FDBB5A34 ✓
- TX witness: ACTUATED at tick 262 (GRANT+1), valid HMAC ✓
- RX witness: ADMIN_ACTIVE at tick 263 (GRANT+2), valid HMAC ✓
- Both witnesses use token 02C861021E4B ✓
5[.] Deriving B3
VM checkpoints for HS-6ABA47:
- Checkpoint 7 (after instruction 7): A6013B1C
- Checkpoint 13 (after instruction 13): 2A19D605
VM_PROOF:
SHA256("BP03-VM-PROOF|35C2C90A3900|HS-6ABA47|A6013B1C>2A19D605|8407CE50")[:12]
= CDE57D9D3BFC
Witness token:
SHA256("BP03-WIT|HS-6ABA47|E4F9C322|FDBB5A34")[:12]
= 02C861021E4B
B3 canonical string:
BP03|35C2C90A3900|HS-6ABA47|F-EBE7ACB>F-0BEC264>F-BEC1B06>F-3AAD5E6|CDE57D9D3BFC|02C861021E4B|6CF2648EBFE8
B3: SHA256(canonical)[:12] = 8CD2027966B9
Flag: `FLAG{REDACTED}
6[.] Verification with Official Console
The evidence probe confirms HS-6ABA47:
python3 evidence_probe[.]py --token 35C2C90A3900 --trace HS-6ABA47
TRACE HS-6ABA47
HELLO F-EBE7ACB tick=258 audit=OK [.][.][.]
CHALLENGE F-0BEC264 tick=259 audit=OK [.][.][.]
RESPONSE F-BEC1B06 tick=260 audit=OK [.][.][.]
GRANT F-3AAD5E6 tick=261 audit=OK [.][.][.]
IDENTITY {'badge_id': 'BADGE-E7A9', 'actual_role': 'VISITOR', [.][.][.]}
witness_token=02C861021E4B TX=OK RX=OK
The custom solver additionally verified the firmware RECOVERY program produces FDBB5A34, matching the captured response_tag[.]
7[.] Solution
- Session: HS-6ABA47
- Badge: BADGE-E7A9 (VISITOR)
- Operator: OP-1474
- Attack: RECOVERY mode used echo_nonce instead of challenge_nonce (firmware flaw), bypassing the counter >= 30 floor check with counter=12
- Final confirmed tick: 261 (within 250–290 window)
- B3:
8CD2027966B9 - Flag: `FLAG{REDACTED}
B3 is retained for Chapter 4 — The Poisoned Evidence.

