Overview
Identify the earliest unauthorised, complete, corroborated blackout sequence affecting fictional CTRL-A on the hotel’s digital control platform, then derive the first incident token B1 per the FUSE-1 protocol. All records/identities are fictional. Python 3.9+ stdlib only; no network required.
Prerequisites / Setup
- Python 3.9+ stdlib
site_policy.txt,protocol_note.txt,evidence_console.py,auth_events.csv,edge_routes.csv,controller_events.csv,service_witnesses.csv,relay_receipts.csv,clock_beacons.csv,trust_register.csv
Recon
Step 1 — Identify the earliest unauthorised, complete, corroborated blackout sequence
Goal: Find the first blackout sequence meeting all site_policy conditions.
site_policy.txt— Approved override rule + candidate sequence conditionsprotocol_note.txt— Clock reconciliation, HMAC integrity tag rules, receipt_code formula, B1 derivationevidence_console.py— Interactive FUSE-1 console to verify a proposed chain and compute B1auth_events.csv— IAM authentication / grant eventsedge_routes.csv— EDGE-GW route / REWIRE eventscontroller_events.csv— CTRL-A / CTRL-B controller eventsservice_witnesses.csv— SENSOR-01 independent availability witnessesrelay_receipts.csv— Paired TX/RX relay receipts for REWIRE eventsclock_beacons.csv— Time-sync beacons per hosttrust_register.csv— Per-host HMAC training/validation keys
Step 2 — Clock reconciliation
Goal: Convert all local times to corrected UTC.
Corrected UTC = local_time − offset. Offsets derived from clock_beacons.csv as observed_local − reference_utc:
| Host | Reference (UTC) | Observed Local | Offset |
|---|---|---|---|
| IAM-GW | 18:10:00Z | 18:10:37 | +37 s |
| EDGE-GW | 18:10:00Z | 18:09:38 | −22 s |
| CTRL-A | 18:10:00Z | 18:11:04 | +64 s |
| CTRL-B | 18:10:00Z | 18:10:15 | +15 s |
| SENSOR-01 | 18:10:00Z | 18:09:49 | −11 s |
All chain comparisons are made in corrected UTC.
Step 3 — Integrity tag verification
Goal: Verify HMAC-SHA256 tags over CSV columns except the last tag column, joined by |, using the host’s key from trust_register.csv. Tag is first 12 uppercase hex chars.
Records failing HMAC are treated as altered/corrupted and excluded. One auth record failed verification.
Step 4 — Candidate sequence conditions (per site_policy.txt)
- Valid IAM record:
grant=CONTROL_OVERRIDE,decision=GRANTED - Matching EDGE-GW
REWIREevent:destination=CTRL-A,result=ACCEPTED, same trace_id & token - Independent paired receipts: TX (EDGE-GW) + RX (CTRL-A) agreeing on trace_id, token, route_event_id, receipt_code
- Matching CTRL-A
BLACKOUT_ARM:result=APPLIED, same trace_id & token - Independent SENSOR-01 witness:
CTRL-A / SERVICE_STATE=DOWN / confidence=CORROBORATED, same trace_id - After clock correction: IAM < EDGE < CTRL < SENSOR; EDGE−IAM ≤ 30 s; CTRL−EDGE ≤ 30 s; SENSOR−CTRL ≤ 60 s
- IAM event must be UNAUTHORISED under the approved override rule: Principal
ops_admin, WorkstationMGMT-01, EAT 21:00:00–21:25:00 on 2026-10-29
Flag
FLAG{REDACTED}
Derived as B1 per the FUSE-1 protocol from the earliest unauthorised, complete, corroborated blackout sequence.
Lessons / Takeaways
- Correlate events across multiple log sources (IAM, EDGE-GW, CTRL, SENSOR) rather than relying on a single log.
- Correct for clock skew before comparing timestamps across hosts.
- Verify HMAC integrity tags over all evidence fields, not just a digest.
- Follow the full chain: unauthorised IAM grant → EDGE-GW REWIRE → paired TX/RX receipts → CTRL-A BLACKOUT_ARM → independent SENSOR-01 witness.
Mitigations
- Enforce approved-override rules server-side so unauthorised grants cannot be issued.
- Verify HMAC tags over all event fields.
- Synchronise clocks and correct for skew before correlating cross-host events.
- Require independent two-sided witnessing (TX + RX) for critical relay events.
Techniques
- HMAC Verification
- Clock Offset Correction
- Chain of Custody
- Offline Forensics
References
- HMAC: RFC 2104: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2104
- NIST SP 800-61: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r2

