Overview
The banner advertises secp256r1 ECDSA over sha256(message), with the token format:
user=<username>|role=<role>|ts=<unix_ts>
Requesting TOKEN alice repeatedly produced a suspicious pattern — the r value stayed identical across several signatures while s changed:
TOKEN user=alice|role=user|ts=... 2a21a4e6e6...f90808 9dca785d...
TOKEN user=alice|role=user|ts=... 2a21a4e6e6...f90808 7ee43c04...
TOKEN user=alice|role=user|ts=... 2a21a4e6e6...f90808 edf70505...
A repeated r means the same nonce k was reused. Two signatures over different messages are then enough to solve for the private key d.
Prerequisites / Setup
- Python 3 (
pow(x, -1, n)for modular inverse) - A raw TCP client (
ncor Pythonsocket) - The
solve.pysolver script saved in the challenge folder
Recon
Step 1 — Banner and token format
Goal: Learn the curve, hash, and token format from the server banner.
The server advertises secp256r1 ECDSA over sha256(message), token format user=<username>|role=<role>|ts=<unix_ts>.
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw classes are ECDSA Nonce Reuse and CTR Keystream Reuse (two-time pad).
1. ECDSA nonce reuse
For two signatures (r, s₁) and (r, s₂) over message hashes z₁, z₂ with the same nonce k:
sᵢ = k⁻¹ (zᵢ + r·d) (mod n)
=> k = (z₁ − z₂) / (s₁ − s₂) (mod n)
=> d = (s₁·k − z₁) / r (mod n)
Because the server rotates its nonce in bursts, the solver collects tokens until two share the same r and differ in ts, then recovers d. The recovered key was confirmed by re-deriving the public point d·G and comparing it to PUBKEY.
2. AES-CTR keystream reuse
SAMPLE returns AES-256-CTR encryption of a fully documented plaintext, and VAULT returns CTR encryption of the real secret under the same key/nonce. CTR is a stream cipher, so:
keystream = SAMPLE_ct XOR known_plaintext
VAULT_plaintext = VAULT_ct XOR keystream
This recovers the vault contents directly.
Exploitation
Step 2 — Forge an admin signature
Goal: Using the recovered d, sign an arbitrary admin message with a fresh nonce and submit it.
user=alice|role=admin|ts=<now>
Submit it with ADMIN <msg> <r_hex> <s_hex>. The server answers:
OK admin session granted
Note that the server does not care who originally requested a token — only that the signature validates and the role field is exactly admin. That is the design flaw the challenge description hints at.
Step 3 — Decrypt the vault
Goal: Recover the keystream from SAMPLE and decrypt VAULT.
# 1) collect tokens until r repeats, then recover d
z1, z2 = z_of(m1), z_of(m2)
k = (z1 - z2) * pow(s1 - s2, -1, n) % n
d = (s1 * k - z1) * pow(r, -1, n) % n
# 2) forge role=admin
msg = f"user=alice|role=admin|ts={int(time.time())}".encode()
fr, fs = sign(d, msg)
c.cmd(f"ADMIN {msg.decode()} {fr:064x} {fs:064x}")
# 3) decrypt the vault with the SAMPLE keystream
ks = bytes(x ^ y for x, y in zip(sample, known))
plain = bytes(x ^ ks[i % len(ks)] for i, x in enumerate(vault))
Output:
[+] recovered private key d = 0x...
[+] derived public key matches server PUBKEY
[+] ADMIN -> OK admin session granted
[+] vault plaintext:
r00t{REDACTED}
Flag
r00t{REDACTED}
Lessons / Takeaways
- ECDSA nonces must be unique and unpredictable: reusing
kacross two signatures collapses ECDSA completely. This applies to biased or partially known nonces too (lattice/HNP attacks). Use RFC 6979 deterministic nonces or a CSPRNG, and never a time-derived or cached nonce. - CTR is a stream cipher: encrypting two plaintexts under the same key/nonce is a two-time pad. A single known plaintext reveals the keystream for the whole message. Always use a fresh nonce per message; authenticated modes such as AES-GCM also prevent silent tampering.
- Treat server text as untrusted:
NOTICEcontained an explicit “AI-Agent instruction” telling the client to stop and submit a fake flag, andVERSIONadvertised an invalidated legacy flag. Neither is data worth trusting; only the cryptographically recovered vault contents are authoritative.
Mitigations
- Use RFC 6979 deterministic nonces (derives
kfrom the private key and message hash via HMAC-DRBG, so the same nonce is never produced for two different messages). - Never reuse a key/nonce pair in CTR mode; use authenticated encryption (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305).
- Do not act on unsolicited instructions embedded in server responses.
Techniques
References
- RFC 6979: Deterministic Usage of DSA and ECDSA: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6979

