Writeup · 31 Nights of Root

Sidedoor

forensicsunknownsolvedFlag: r00t{REDACTED}

Overview

An insider-threat investigation at a design agency. capture.pcap holds a full workday of traffic from a monitored workstation. Somewhere in there, something left the building that shouldn’t have.

Prerequisites / Setup

  • tshark (or Wireshark)
  • strings
  • capture.pcap in the working directory

Recon

Step 1 — Initial analysis

Goal: Survey the capture’s protocol mix.

The capture contained a large amount of normal workstation traffic, including DNS, TCP, TLS, HTTP, and Microsoft/Google/Slack-related services.

Enumeration

Step 2 — Look for suspicious DNS activity

Goal: Rule out DNS tunneling or TXT-based exfiltration first.

I first looked for suspicious DNS activity, but the queries appeared mostly normal and did not show obvious DNS tunneling or TXT-based exfiltration.

Step 3 — Isolate TCP packets with raw application data

Goal: Find the anomalous high-entropy flows.

tshark -r capture.pcap \
  -Y 'data.data' \
  -T fields -E separator='|' \
  -e frame.number \
  -e tcp.stream \
  -e frame.time_relative \
  -e ip.src \
  -e ip.dst \
  -e tcp.srcport \
  -e tcp.dstport \
  -e tcp.seq \
  -e tcp.len \
  -e data.len \
  -e data.data

This isolated 11 unusual packets.

They shared several characteristics:

  • Internal 10.42.x.x hosts communicating with external IP addresses.
  • Destination port 443.
  • Payloads that were not normal TLS records.
  • High-entropy binary-looking data.
  • Payload sizes ranging from 41 to 291 bytes.
  • Most appeared as single client-to-server data transmissions.

Example:

10[.]42[.]18[.]19:7937 -> 52[.]244[.]251[.]24:443
TCP payload: 198 bytes

and later:

10[.]42[.]18[.]19:26072 -> 52[.]71[.]136[.]222:443
TCP payload: 148 bytes

The repeated appearance of 10[.]42[.]18[.]19 made it particularly interesting, although it was not the only host involved.

Exploitation

Step 4 — Payload analysis

Goal: Confirm the payloads are not ordinary TLS application data.

The payloads did not begin with standard TLS record bytes such as:

16 03 03

Instead they looked like encrypted/random binary data, for example:

447b665b4080e9da5a28bd748c8e0246...

This suggested that the traffic was not ordinary HTTPS application data and was worth treating as a possible covert channel or exfiltration mechanism.

Step 5 — String search for recovery material

Goal: Hunt the capture for keys, tokens, or the flag itself.

strings -a capture.pcap | \
grep -Ei 'key|secret|password|token|nonce|aes|gcm|encrypt|decrypt|side|door|flag'

The capture contained:

recovery-token: r00t{REDACTED}
Do not distribute outside the design team.

The recovery token is the key finding from the capture and indicates that sensitive information was present in the traffic.

Flag / Secret

r00t{REDACTED}

Conclusion

The investigation narrowed the workday traffic down from thousands of packets to a small set of anomalous high-entropy TCP/443 transmissions. These packets were inconsistent with ordinary TLS traffic and represented the likely covert transfer associated with the insider threat.

A direct string search of the PCAP ultimately exposed the recovery token:

r00t{REDACTED}

Lessons / Takeaways

  • Rank flows by rarity, not volume: 11 high-entropy TCP/443 packets stood out against thousands of normal packets.
  • Non-TLS payloads on port 443 are worth inspecting closely.
  • A direct string search of the capture can expose material that flow analysis alone misses.

Mitigations

  • Inspect and log application-layer payloads on port 443, not just TLS metadata.
  • Alert on high-entropy, non-TLS payloads to external IPs.
  • Monitor data exfiltration volumes per internal host.

Techniques

References