Writeup · 31 Nights of Root

EVTX Insider Exfiltration

forensicsunknownpartialFlag: r00t{REDACTED}

Overview

Two Windows event logs record an insider staging, archiving and uploading client data after hours:

  • Security.evtx — Windows Security log (logons, object access).
  • Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon_4Operational.evtx — Sysmon operational log (process creation, file creation, network connections).

The task is to reconstruct the intrusion and answer six questions:

  • Q1: Account that logged on after hours
  • Q2: Source IP of that logon
  • Q3: Staging directory
  • Q4: Archive filename
  • Q5: Domain that received the archive
  • Q6: Upload time (to the second)

Prerequisites / Setup

  • python-evtx (pip install python-evtx --break-system-packages), or evtx_dump, Chainsaw, Hayabusa, or Windows Event Viewer
  • The original .evtx files (the CSV/JSON exports are lossy — see Trap 1)

Recon

Step 1 — Recognize the trap: the CSV/JSON exports are incomplete

Goal: Confirm the provided evtx-events.json and .csv exports are lossy before investing in them.

The first two files provided (evtx-events.json and .csv) were lossy exports. They contained only Sysmon Event IDs 1, 7 and 11 plus some Security events. Specifically they were missing:

  • the real n.wanjiru logon record (the export only showed a ::1 Kerberos logon with a corrupt 1601-01-01 timestamp)
  • every Sysmon Event 3 (network connection), which is where the exfil destination lives

Step 2 — Parse the original .evtx files

Goal: Parse both event logs with python-evtx.

pip install python-evtx --break-system-packages
import re
from Evtx.Evtx import Evtx

def parse(path):
    rows = []
    with Evtx(path) as log:
        for rec in log.records():
            xml = rec.xml()
            eid  = int(re.search(r'<EventID[^>]*>(\d+)<', xml).group(1))
            ts   = re.search(r'SystemTime="([^"]+)"', xml).group(1)
            data = dict(re.findall(r'<Data Name="([^"]+)">([^<]*)</Data>', xml))
            rows.append((ts, eid, data))
    return sorted(rows, key=lambda r: r[0])

for f in ["Security.evtx", "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon_4Operational.evtx"]:
    for ts, eid, d in parse(f):
        print(ts, eid, d.get("Image"), d.get("TargetFilename"))

Alternatives: evtx_dump (Rust), Chainsaw, Hayabusa or Windows Event Viewer.

Step 3 — Know the Event ID reference

Goal: Map event IDs to the questions they answer.

Log Event ID Meaning Used for
Security 4624 Successful logon Q1, Q2
Security 4663 Object access attempt Context
Sysmon 1 Process creation Q4
Sysmon 3 Network connection Q5, Q6
Sysmon 11 File created Q3

Recon — Step 4: Reading the timestamps (important)

Goal: Use the correct timestamp field.

The logs are a composite. The events relevant to this scenario were injected into older sample logs, so each record carries two timestamps:

Field Example Meaning
TimeCreated/@SystemTime (record header) 2026-09-14 00:07:22 The scenario timeline
UtcTime (inside EventData, Sysmon only) 2020-08-02 16:24:59.242 Leftover from the source sample

Enumeration — Reconstructed timeline

All times UTC. Nairobi (EAT) is UTC+3.

timeline
    title Intrusion timeline (UTC)
    23:47:12 : RDP logon as n.wanjiru from 203[.]0[.]113[.]77
    23:52:30 : ClientExports_Raw.xlsx created in F:\Staging
    23:56:00 : Finance share files and browser credential stores accessed
    00:03:45 : 7z.exe archives F:\Staging to client_exports_final.7z
    00:07:22 : 7z.exe connects out to vault-personal-sync[.]io:443
UTC time (2026) EAT Log Event What happened
09-13 23:47:12 02:47 Security 4624 n.wanjiru RDP logon (type 10) from 203[.]0[.]113[.]77
09-13 23:52:30 02:52 Sysmon 11 explorer.exe creates F:\Staging\ClientExports_Raw.xlsx
09-13 23:56:00 02:56 Security 4663 Access to Q3_Client_Contracts.xlsx, Client_Master_List.xlsx, Firefox logins.json, Chrome Login Data
09-14 00:03:45 03:03 Sysmon 1 7z.exe a -p client_exports_final.7z F:\Staging\*
09-14 00:07:22 03:07 Sysmon 3 7z.exe outbound TCP/443 to vault-personal-sync[.]io

Exploitation — Question-by-question

Q1 — Account logging on after hours

Goal: Identify the account behind the after-hours logon.

Answer: `r00t{REDACTED}

Every user-activity event in the scenario window is attributed to n.wanjiru (for example the Sysmon paths under C:\Users\n.wanjiru\). The logon occurs at 23:47 UTC = 02:47 in Nairobi, which is clearly outside business hours.

Q2 — Source IP of the logon

Goal: Find the source IP of the n.wanjiru logon.

Answer: 203[.]0[.]113[.]77

Filter Security events to 4624 and look at the n.wanjiru record:

Field Value
TargetUserName n.wanjiru
LogonType 10 (RemoteInteractive / RDP)
IpAddress 203[.]0[.]113[.]77
SystemTime 2026-09-13 23:47:12

Logon type 10 (RDP from outside) at 02:47 is itself a strong indicator of abnormal access.

Q3 — Staging directory

Goal: Find where files were staged before archiving.

Answer: `r00t{REDACTED}

Sysmon Event 11 (FileCreate):

Image          : C:\Windows\explorer.exe
TargetFilename : F:\Staging\ClientExports_Raw.xlsx
SystemTime     : 2026-09-13 23:52:30

This is corroborated by the archive command in Q4, which targets F:\Staging\*.

Q4 — Archive filename

Goal: Find the archive filename.

Answer: `r00t{REDACTED}

Sysmon Event 1 (ProcessCreate):

Image       : C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7z.exe
CommandLine : 7z.exe a -p client_exports_final.7z F:\Staging\*
User        : P3RFCORP\n.wanjiru
SystemTime  : 2026-09-14 00:03:45

a is 7-Zip’s “add to archive” command and -p sets a password, so the archive is encrypted, which is typical when hiding exfil contents from DLP or inspection.

Q5 — Domain that received the archive

Goal: Find the domain that received the exfiltrated archive.

Answer: vault-personal-sync[.]io

Sysmon Event 3 (NetworkConnect) is absent from the CSV/JSON export, so it must come from the original .evtx:

Image               : C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7z.exe
Initiated           : true
Protocol            : tcp
DestinationHostname : vault-personal-sync[.]io
DestinationPort     : 443
SystemTime          : 2026-09-14 00:07:22

Q6 — Exfiltration time

Goal: Find the upload timestamp.

Timestamp: 2026-09-14 00:07:22 UTC (03:07:22 EAT)

This is the SystemTime of the 7z.exe -> vault-personal-sync[.]io Event 3 record.

Dead Ends / Noise and distractors

These events are from the older source logs and are not part of the intrusion. They are worth recognising so they don’t derail analysis:

  • lync.zip / cmdkey.exe / i.exe chain (Sysmon, 00:00:00 record time): an unrelated ZIP-folder cmdkey credential technique, with an Elastic Endpoint “Malicious Behavior Detection” popup. It is a separate sample, not the exfil.
  • calc.exe, RuntimeBroker.exe, CV.exe (23:50:00): process activity from a different capture.
  • nc.exe, whoami, cmd.exe, FXSSVC.exe (00:05:00): lateral-movement style sample data.
  • Security 4725 / 4776 / 5145 / 1102: account-disable, NTLM validation, share-access and log-cleared events from a 2020 capture (the Administrator / 172[.]16[.]66[.]37 session).
  • A flag-shaped string appears in the SubjectUserName of a 4725 record. It doesn’t answer any of the six questions and was not used.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

Tactic Technique Evidence
Initial Access T1078 Valid Accounts RDP logon as n.wanjiru
Lateral Movement T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol Logon type 10 from 203[.]0[.]113[.]77
Credential Access T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers 4663 on Firefox logins.json, Chrome Login Data
Collection T1074.001 Local Data Staging F:\Staging
Collection T1560.001 Archive via Utility 7z.exe a -p ...
Exfiltration T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service 7z.exe -> vault-personal-sync[.]io:443

Indicators of compromise

Account        : P3RFCORP\n.wanjiru
Source IP      : 203[.]0[.]113[.]77
Staging dir    : F:\Staging
Staged file    : F:\Staging\ClientExports_Raw.xlsx
Archive        : client_exports_final.7z   (password protected)
Tool           : C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7z.exe
Exfil domain   : vault-personal-sync[.]io  (TCP/443)
Exfil time     : 2026-09-14 00:07:22 UTC

Detection ideas

  • Alert on 4624 logon type 10 from external IPs outside business hours.
  • Alert on 7z.exe / rar.exe / zip utilities making outbound connections (Sysmon Event 3).
  • Alert on archive creation with -p / password flags from a staging path.
  • Alert on non-browser processes reading browser credential stores (Firefox logins.json, Chrome Login Data).
  • Block or monitor newly seen “sync” / “vault” style file-sharing domains at the proxy.

Lessons / Takeaways

  1. Go to the source files. Derived exports (CSV/JSON) silently dropped the evidence for Q2, Q5 and Q6.
  2. Know which timestamp you’re reading. SystemTime in the record header versus the UtcTime inside the payload.
  3. Follow the process chain, not just individual events: logon -> staging -> archive -> network.
  4. Treat 7-Zip making a network connection as a red flag.
  5. Convert to local time before judging “after hours”.

Mitigations

  • Query original .evtx files rather than derived CSV/JSON exports, which silently drop evidence.
  • Alert on 4624 logon type 10 from external IPs outside business hours.
  • Alert on 7z.exe / rar.exe / zip utilities making outbound connections (Sysmon Event 3).
  • Alert on archive creation with -p / password flags from a staging path.
  • Alert on non-browser processes reading browser credential stores (Firefox logins.json, Chrome Login Data).
  • Block or monitor newly seen “sync” / “vault” style file-sharing domains at the proxy.

Techniques

References