Overview
Two Windows event logs record an insider staging, archiving and uploading client data after hours:
Security.evtx— Windows Security log (logons, object access).Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon_4Operational.evtx— Sysmon operational log (process creation, file creation, network connections).
The task is to reconstruct the intrusion and answer six questions:
- Q1: Account that logged on after hours
- Q2: Source IP of that logon
- Q3: Staging directory
- Q4: Archive filename
- Q5: Domain that received the archive
- Q6: Upload time (to the second)
Prerequisites / Setup
python-evtx(pip install python-evtx --break-system-packages), orevtx_dump, Chainsaw, Hayabusa, or Windows Event Viewer- The original
.evtxfiles (the CSV/JSON exports are lossy — see Trap 1)
Recon
Step 1 — Recognize the trap: the CSV/JSON exports are incomplete
Goal: Confirm the provided evtx-events.json and .csv exports are lossy before investing in them.
The first two files provided (evtx-events.json and .csv) were lossy exports. They contained only Sysmon Event IDs 1, 7 and 11 plus some Security events. Specifically they were missing:
- the real
n.wanjirulogon record (the export only showed a::1Kerberos logon with a corrupt1601-01-01timestamp) - every Sysmon Event 3 (network connection), which is where the exfil destination lives
Step 2 — Parse the original .evtx files
Goal: Parse both event logs with python-evtx.
pip install python-evtx --break-system-packages
import re
from Evtx.Evtx import Evtx
def parse(path):
rows = []
with Evtx(path) as log:
for rec in log.records():
xml = rec.xml()
eid = int(re.search(r'<EventID[^>]*>(\d+)<', xml).group(1))
ts = re.search(r'SystemTime="([^"]+)"', xml).group(1)
data = dict(re.findall(r'<Data Name="([^"]+)">([^<]*)</Data>', xml))
rows.append((ts, eid, data))
return sorted(rows, key=lambda r: r[0])
for f in ["Security.evtx", "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon_4Operational.evtx"]:
for ts, eid, d in parse(f):
print(ts, eid, d.get("Image"), d.get("TargetFilename"))
Alternatives: evtx_dump (Rust), Chainsaw, Hayabusa or Windows Event Viewer.
Step 3 — Know the Event ID reference
Goal: Map event IDs to the questions they answer.
| Log | Event ID | Meaning | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security | 4624 | Successful logon | Q1, Q2 |
| Security | 4663 | Object access attempt | Context |
| Sysmon | 1 | Process creation | Q4 |
| Sysmon | 3 | Network connection | Q5, Q6 |
| Sysmon | 11 | File created | Q3 |
Recon — Step 4: Reading the timestamps (important)
Goal: Use the correct timestamp field.
The logs are a composite. The events relevant to this scenario were injected into older sample logs, so each record carries two timestamps:
| Field | Example | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
TimeCreated/@SystemTime (record header) |
2026-09-14 00:07:22 |
The scenario timeline |
UtcTime (inside EventData, Sysmon only) |
2020-08-02 16:24:59.242 |
Leftover from the source sample |
Enumeration — Reconstructed timeline
All times UTC. Nairobi (EAT) is UTC+3.
timeline
title Intrusion timeline (UTC)
23:47:12 : RDP logon as n.wanjiru from 203[.]0[.]113[.]77
23:52:30 : ClientExports_Raw.xlsx created in F:\Staging
23:56:00 : Finance share files and browser credential stores accessed
00:03:45 : 7z.exe archives F:\Staging to client_exports_final.7z
00:07:22 : 7z.exe connects out to vault-personal-sync[.]io:443
| UTC time (2026) | EAT | Log | Event | What happened |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09-13 23:47:12 | 02:47 | Security | 4624 | n.wanjiru RDP logon (type 10) from 203[.]0[.]113[.]77 |
| 09-13 23:52:30 | 02:52 | Sysmon | 11 | explorer.exe creates F:\Staging\ClientExports_Raw.xlsx |
| 09-13 23:56:00 | 02:56 | Security | 4663 | Access to Q3_Client_Contracts.xlsx, Client_Master_List.xlsx, Firefox logins.json, Chrome Login Data |
| 09-14 00:03:45 | 03:03 | Sysmon | 1 | 7z.exe a -p client_exports_final.7z F:\Staging\* |
| 09-14 00:07:22 | 03:07 | Sysmon | 3 | 7z.exe outbound TCP/443 to vault-personal-sync[.]io |
Exploitation — Question-by-question
Q1 — Account logging on after hours
Goal: Identify the account behind the after-hours logon.
Answer: `r00t{REDACTED}
Every user-activity event in the scenario window is attributed to n.wanjiru (for example the Sysmon paths under C:\Users\n.wanjiru\). The logon occurs at 23:47 UTC = 02:47 in Nairobi, which is clearly outside business hours.
Q2 — Source IP of the logon
Goal: Find the source IP of the n.wanjiru logon.
Answer: 203[.]0[.]113[.]77
Filter Security events to 4624 and look at the n.wanjiru record:
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| TargetUserName | n.wanjiru |
| LogonType | 10 (RemoteInteractive / RDP) |
| IpAddress | 203[.]0[.]113[.]77 |
| SystemTime | 2026-09-13 23:47:12 |
Logon type 10 (RDP from outside) at 02:47 is itself a strong indicator of abnormal access.
Q3 — Staging directory
Goal: Find where files were staged before archiving.
Answer: `r00t{REDACTED}
Sysmon Event 11 (FileCreate):
Image : C:\Windows\explorer.exe
TargetFilename : F:\Staging\ClientExports_Raw.xlsx
SystemTime : 2026-09-13 23:52:30
This is corroborated by the archive command in Q4, which targets F:\Staging\*.
Q4 — Archive filename
Goal: Find the archive filename.
Answer: `r00t{REDACTED}
Sysmon Event 1 (ProcessCreate):
Image : C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7z.exe
CommandLine : 7z.exe a -p client_exports_final.7z F:\Staging\*
User : P3RFCORP\n.wanjiru
SystemTime : 2026-09-14 00:03:45
a is 7-Zip’s “add to archive” command and -p sets a password, so the archive is encrypted, which is typical when hiding exfil contents from DLP or inspection.
Q5 — Domain that received the archive
Goal: Find the domain that received the exfiltrated archive.
Answer: vault-personal-sync[.]io
Sysmon Event 3 (NetworkConnect) is absent from the CSV/JSON export, so it must come from the original .evtx:
Image : C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7z.exe
Initiated : true
Protocol : tcp
DestinationHostname : vault-personal-sync[.]io
DestinationPort : 443
SystemTime : 2026-09-14 00:07:22
Q6 — Exfiltration time
Goal: Find the upload timestamp.
Timestamp: 2026-09-14 00:07:22 UTC (03:07:22 EAT)
This is the SystemTime of the 7z.exe -> vault-personal-sync[.]io Event 3 record.
Dead Ends / Noise and distractors
These events are from the older source logs and are not part of the intrusion. They are worth recognising so they don’t derail analysis:
lync.zip/cmdkey.exe/i.exechain (Sysmon, 00:00:00 record time): an unrelated ZIP-foldercmdkeycredential technique, with an Elastic Endpoint “Malicious Behavior Detection” popup. It is a separate sample, not the exfil.calc.exe,RuntimeBroker.exe,CV.exe(23:50:00): process activity from a different capture.nc.exe,whoami,cmd.exe,FXSSVC.exe(00:05:00): lateral-movement style sample data.- Security 4725 / 4776 / 5145 / 1102: account-disable, NTLM validation, share-access and log-cleared events from a 2020 capture (the
Administrator/172[.]16[.]66[.]37session). - A flag-shaped string appears in the
SubjectUserNameof a 4725 record. It doesn’t answer any of the six questions and was not used.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Tactic | Technique | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1078 Valid Accounts | RDP logon as n.wanjiru |
| Lateral Movement | T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol | Logon type 10 from 203[.]0[.]113[.]77 |
| Credential Access | T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers | 4663 on Firefox logins.json, Chrome Login Data |
| Collection | T1074.001 Local Data Staging | F:\Staging |
| Collection | T1560.001 Archive via Utility | 7z.exe a -p ... |
| Exfiltration | T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service | 7z.exe -> vault-personal-sync[.]io:443 |
Indicators of compromise
Account : P3RFCORP\n.wanjiru
Source IP : 203[.]0[.]113[.]77
Staging dir : F:\Staging
Staged file : F:\Staging\ClientExports_Raw.xlsx
Archive : client_exports_final.7z (password protected)
Tool : C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7z.exe
Exfil domain : vault-personal-sync[.]io (TCP/443)
Exfil time : 2026-09-14 00:07:22 UTC
Detection ideas
- Alert on 4624 logon type 10 from external IPs outside business hours.
- Alert on
7z.exe/rar.exe/ziputilities making outbound connections (Sysmon Event 3). - Alert on archive creation with
-p/ password flags from a staging path. - Alert on non-browser processes reading browser credential stores (Firefox
logins.json, ChromeLogin Data). - Block or monitor newly seen “sync” / “vault” style file-sharing domains at the proxy.
Lessons / Takeaways
- Go to the source files. Derived exports (CSV/JSON) silently dropped the evidence for Q2, Q5 and Q6.
- Know which timestamp you’re reading.
SystemTimein the record header versus theUtcTimeinside the payload. - Follow the process chain, not just individual events: logon -> staging -> archive -> network.
- Treat 7-Zip making a network connection as a red flag.
- Convert to local time before judging “after hours”.
Mitigations
- Query original
.evtxfiles rather than derived CSV/JSON exports, which silently drop evidence. - Alert on 4624 logon type 10 from external IPs outside business hours.
- Alert on
7z.exe/rar.exe/ziputilities making outbound connections (Sysmon Event 3). - Alert on archive creation with
-p/ password flags from a staging path. - Alert on non-browser processes reading browser credential stores (Firefox
logins.json, ChromeLogin Data). - Block or monitor newly seen “sync” / “vault” style file-sharing domains at the proxy.
Techniques
References
- Windows Event Log (EVTX) format: https://github.com/libyal/libevtx
- Sysmon Event ID reference: https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config

