Prototype

Application security gateway

TOTP-gated, admin-approved access to an internal application, without a VPN client.

Updated Sept 2026Rust 2024TOTPnftablesrustlsPostgreSQLPrivate — limited public detail

Problem

An internal application needed tighter access than a shared VPN credentials model could offer, without asking users to install another client. The requirement was to grant access per person, prove who they were, and keep the network policy out of the application’s hands.

Design

The gateway is a Rust 2024 edition appliance. A captive portal collects a TOTP second factor; an administrator approves the session remotely; each user gets one session at a time. Privilege separation keeps the enforcement layer isolated: a root helper drives nftables on Linux and has no network listener of its own. Transport uses step-ca and rustls TLS 1.3, and secrets are encrypted at rest with pgcrypto.

Scope and limits

The design is default-deny: no route exists until the approval flow creates it. The architecture decisions are recorded in ADRs, and the user, platform, secrets and enforcement-helper modules carry their own tests.

Outcome

A working Linux-side prototype that demonstrates a VPN-client-free access path with a clear privilege boundary.

Limitations

Private work — the employer and repository are not named publicly. Windows WFP enforcement remains pending, and no public evidence link is available yet.

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